United States v. Alvarez-Machain: Kidnapping in the  War on Drugs  - A Matter of Executive Discretion or Lawlessness? by McKinnon, Michael G.
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 20 | Issue 4 Article 6
5-15-1993
United States v. Alvarez-Machain: Kidnapping in
the "War on Drugs" - A Matter of Executive
Discretion or Lawlessness?
Michael G. McKinnon
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal
Procedure Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, International Law Commons, Law and
Society Commons, Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons, President/Executive Department
Commons, and the Remedies Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael G. McKinnon United States v. Alvarez-Machain: Kidnapping in the "War on Drugs" - A Matter of Executive Discretion or
Lawlessness?, 20 Pepp. L. Rev. 4 (1993)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol20/iss4/6
United States v. Alvarez-Machain:
Kidnapping in the "War on Drugs"-
A Matter of Executive Discretion or Lawlessness?
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 15, 1992, the United States Supreme Court held that the
unilateral abduction of a Mexican national by federal agents did not
violate the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty or the United States Constitu-
tion.' Within hours of the opinion's release, Mexico officially suspended
its cooperation with the United States in drug investigations The Mex-
ican Foreign Ministry called the court ruling "invalid and unacceptable"
and in contradiction with "essential principles of international law."'
Other governments around the world similarly condemned the Court's
decision as unacceptable.'
1. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2197 (1992).
2. Marjorie Miller, Mexico Attacks Ruling; Halts Drug War Role, LA. TIMEs, June
16, 1992, at A6.
3. Id. Shortly after the Supreme Court decision the Mexican Foreign Minister held
a press conference and some of the highlights were as follows:
Mexico repudiates as invalid and illegal the decision of the Supreme Court;
Mexico will consider as a criminal act any attempt by foreign persons or
governments to apprehend in Mexican territory any person suspected of a
crime;
Mexico demands the return of Alvarez-Machain;
Mexico declares that the only legal means for moving a person from one
nation to face trial in another are treaties and mechanisms of extradition es-
tablished under international law; [and]
Foreign law enforcement officials of any country who operate in Mexican
territory will be asked to observe updated rules that the Government of Mex-
ico will establish.
The Alvarez-Machain Decision, 3 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 614(3) (1992) (statement by
Deputy Legal Adviser Alan J. Kreczko before the House Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights, July 24, 1992).
4. Sharon LaFranlere, Baker Offers Reassurances After Court Kidnap Ruling,
WASH. POST, June 17, 1992, at A2. On June 26, 1992, the Presidents of Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay issued a declaration that expressed their
concern with the Supreme Court decision. The Alvarez-Machain Decision, 3 U.S.
DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 614(3) (1992). Specifically, they requested that the Inter-American
Juridical Committee of the Organization of American States (OAS) issue an opinion
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Ironically, the decision came at a time of unprecedented economic
and political cooperation between the United States and Mexico. Enthu-
siasm for the long awaited North American Trade Agreement was at an
all time high.' Coordination in drug enforcement efforts had also pro-
gressed significantly between the two countries. Mexican President
Carlos Salinas de Gortari, who views drug trafficking as a national secu-
rity threat,7 has worked more closely with United States in fighting
"The Drug War" than any previous Mexican president.'
In an effort to appease the Mexican government, Secretary of State
James A. Baker I made a public statement that the United States still
respected the sovereignty of foreign governments.' The State De-
partment, however, did not offer any guarantees that the United States
would refrain from similar abductions in the future." Following Secre-
tary Baker's statements, Attorney General William P. Barr stated that
the United States would use its "snatch" authority "only in the most
compelling circumstances."" It is unclear, however, what circumstanc-
es would be "compelling." According to a former head of the Justice
on the "international juridical validity" of the Alvarez-Machain decision. Id.
5. Marjorie Miller, Narcotics; Friendly fire in Front Lines of Drug War, LA.
TIMEs, August 1, 1992, at A3.
6. Id.
7. The Salinas Administration increased the level of resources devoted to the "war
on drugs" from $37 million in 1989 to $77 million in 1991. U.S-Mexico Relations
(Economic and Political Relations, North American Free Trade Agreement), 3 U.S.
DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, 620(2) (1992). The Mexican government succeeded in eradicating
one-third of the 1991 estimated marijuana crop and has implemented both a tougher
stance against drug-related money laundering and a vigorous asset seizure program.
Id.
8. Miller, supra note 5, at A3. Under the Salinas Administration, the United States
and Mexico have implemented dozens of cooperative agreements intended to curb
illegal narcotics trafflcking. See GUIDE TO TREATIES IN FORCE, NUMERICAL LIST, 538-39
(1992) (listing U.S.-Mexico treaties in drug enforcement). The flagship of these agree-
ments is the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, signed on December 9, 1987, which en-
hances the capability of both governments to prosecute criminals operating on both
sides of the border. See Mexico-United States: Mutual Legal Assistance Cooperation
Treaty 27 I.LM. 443, 447 (1988). The treaty includes mutual assistance in the taking
of witness testimony, the execution of searches and seizures, and the serving of doc-
uments. Id.
9. LaFranlere, supra note 4, at A2. Soon thereafter, President Bush sent a letter
to President Salinas assuring that the Bush Administration will "neither conduct, en-
courage nor condone" such trans-border abductions from Mexico. The Alvarez-
Machain Decision, supra note 3, at 614(3).
10. In a statement before the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights, Deputy Legal Adviser Alan J. Kreczko stated that the State Department be-
lieves that the Court correctly decided Alvarez-Machain because it protects "impor-
tant presidential prerogatives." The Alvarez-Machain Decision, supra note 3, at
614(3).
11. LaFraniere, supra note 4, at A2.
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Department's Office of International Affairs, although such occasions
would be rare, abductions are a necessary law enforcement tool when
officially sanctioned terrorism or drug trafficking is involved. 2 Despite
public assurances that official abductions require "rare" and "compel-
ling" circumstances, government abductions are in fact often used to
gain custody over criminals located on foreign soil.13 Moreover, these
abductions are commonly carried out with the acquiescence, and some-
times silent cooperation, of Mexican officials."
Notwithstanding the U.S. government's seemingly "unofficial" accep-
tance of abductions, international law experts strongly denounce the
practice."1 These scholars argue that abductions violate fundamental
12. Id.
13. See Abraham Abramovsky, Extraterritorial Abductions: America's "Catch and
Snatch" Policy Run Amok, 31 VA. J. INT'L L 151, 156-67 (1991) (discussing various
cases involving the abduction of foreign criminals); Stephen J. Hedges & Gordon
Wltkin, Kidnapping Drug Lords; The US. Has Done It for Decades, But It Rarely
Causes Trouble, U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REPORT, May 14, 1990, at 28; Paul Lieberman,
Camerena Case Spotlight Shifts to L.A. Unit's Tactics, LA. TIMES, May 7, 1990, at
Al. For United States law enforcement authorities, kidnapping is an attractive means
of apprehension because it avoids often lengthy extradition proceedings and official
corruption that can shield and even free suspects. See Abramovsky, supra note 12, at
151. For further discussion of the DEA's resort to official abductions, see infra notes
324-49 and accompanying text.
14. Abramovsky, supra note 13, at 162-67. In 1986, Mexican authorities shoved
Rene Verdugo-Urquidez, a suspect in the murder of DEA agent Enrique Camerena,
through a border fence to waiting U.S. Border Patrol agents. Id. at 163. Also, a for-
mer Mexican policeman planned and executed the abduction of Dr. Alvarez-Machain,
another suspect in the Camerena case. Lieberman, supra note 13, at Al. However,
the district court imputed the U.S. government with official responsibility because the
DEA offered a bounty for Dr. Machain's arrest United States v. Caro-Quntero, 745 F.
Supp. 599, 609 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (finding that the DEA and Its informants were suffi-
ciently involved to impute state responsibility), affd sub nom. United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
Mexico's official protest may be more the product of internal Mexican politics
rather than a genuine fear that abductions violate Mexican territorial soveriegnty. See
Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 602. During official negotiations with DEA agents,
Mexican officials suggested that the transfer of Dr. Machain be carried out "under the
table" because its revelation would "upset" Mexican citizens. Id. Only after these
negotiations failed did the DEA solicit bounty hunters to carry out Dr. Machain's
arrest Id. at 603. For more detail on Mexico's official involvement, see ifra notes
169-81 and accompanying text.
15. See Abramovsky, supra note 13, at 201-08; see generally Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
Still More on Kidnapping, 85 AM. J. INT'L L 655 (1991) [hereinafter Lowenfeld I]; H.
Moss Crystie, Comment, When Rights Fall in a Forest... The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine
and American Judicial Countenance of Extraterritorial Abductions and Torture, 9
1505
principles of international law."6 Basic rules of territorial sovereignty
and individual freedom from arbitrary arrest are utterly ignored when
one nation kidnaps the nationals of another. 7 Arguably, abductions
also violate current extradition treaties. 8 If the basic function of extra-
dition treaties is to provide clear-cut procedures for obtaining custody
of a fugitive, then abductions which circumvent these procedures un-
dermine the very certainty and protection that extradition treaties are
intended to provide. 9 Lastly, these scholars argue that international
abductions are inconsistent with the constitutional notions of due pro-
cess that government agents must abide by at home.2'
In essence, it is argued that aside from violating specific international
law principles and extradition treaties, abductions tend to undermine
respect for international norms and human rights in general." More-
over, if this trend continues, the United States may find itself victimized
DicK. J. INT'L L 387 (1991); Jonathan Gentin, Comment Government-Sponsored Ab-
duction of Foreign Criminals Abroad: Reflections on United States v. Caro-Quintero
and the Inadequacy of the Ker-Prisbie Doctrine, 40 EMORY L.J. 1227 (1991); Richard
Downing, Comment, The Domestic and International Legal Implications of the Ab-
duction of Criminals From Foreign Soil, 26 STN. J. IN 'L L 573 (1990); Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, US. Law Enforcement Abroad The Constitution and International Law,
84 AM. J. INT'L L 444 (1990) [hereinafter Lowenfeld 1I]; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, US.
Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L
L 880 (1989) [hereinafter Lowenfeld III].
16. See Crystle, supra note 15, at 401-05; Downing, supra note 15, at 588-89;
Gentin, supra note 15, at 1252-58; Lowenfeld II, supra note 15, at 472-74. For further
discussion on the illegality of abductions under international law, see infra notes 133-
39 and accompanying text.
17. See Downing, supra note 15, at 589-91; Gentin, supra note 15, at 1252;
Lowenfeld fl, supra note 15, at 472-73.
18. Lowenfeld I, supra note 15, at 658-59; Abramovsky, supra note 15, at 206-08;
For further discussion on abductions and extradition treaties, see ifra notes 69-126
and accompanying text.
19. Lowenfeld I, supra note 15, at 658-60; Abramovsky, supra note 13, at 208.
20. See Lowenfeld M, supra note 15, at 884-93. For a nation that fancies itself a
protector of basic human rights and demands other governments to respect the rights
of their own nationals, an official policy of abduction is hypocritical and harms Unit-
ed States credibility. See Crystle, supra note 15, at 387-400. For further discussion re-
garding the impact that abductions have on U.S. foreign relations, see infra notes
338-45 and accompanying text.
Historically, unilateral abductions by state agents violated defendants' due pro-
cess rights under the Fifth Amendment (if ddnapped by federal agents) and Four-
teenth Amendment (if by state agents). See Lowenfeld II, supra note 15, at 459-64.
However, in Alvarez-Machain, the United States Supreme Court, relying on the Ker-
Prisbie doctrine, disagreed and held that abductions alone do not violate due pro-
cess. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2196-97 (1992). For a
discussion of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, see infra notes 41-54 and accompanying text
21. LaFraniere, supra note 4, at A2; Abramovsky supra note 13, at 206-08;
Lowenfeld II, supra note 15, at 472-75.
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by its own renegade practices as other nations resort to abductions in
lieu of formal extradition procedures.'
These concerns formed the basis of the arguments before the United
States District Court in the Alvarez-Machain case.' In particular, Dr.
Machain argued that his abduction by paid agents of the DEA violated
due process, international law and the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty,
and therefore, the court should divest itself of jurisdiction.' The dis-
trict court for the central district of California granted Dr. Machain's
motion, and the Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.' The
United States Supreme Court, however, reversed and rejected Dr.
Machain's arguments in toto.28 Announcing the opinion of the Court,
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that neither the United States Consti-
tution nor the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty limit the government's
discretionary power to resort to official abductions.27 As for the al-
leged violation of international law principles, the Court held that such
complaints may be taken up with the executive branch, but present no
cause of action in domestic courts.'
As the following analysis will show, there is support for the Supreme
Court's conclusion in American jurisprudence. The separation of pow-
ers principle suggests strongly that the Court should afford the execu-
tive branch a large amount of discretion with respect to international
22. Downing, supra note 15, at 594. See also Abramovsky, supra note 13, at 151-52
(hypothetical example). An immediate concern is that unilateral abductions by the
United States may lead to similar abductions by other nations. Downing, supra note
15, at 592; Abramovsky, supra note 13, at 201-03. More importantly, disrespect for
territorial soveriegnty threatens other areas of international law by encouraging na-
tions to take matters into their own hands rather than abide by international law
principles. Abramovsky, supra note 13, at 151-52; Downing, supra note 15, at 594.
23. See United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 600 (C.D. Cal. 1990), affd
sub nora. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112
S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
24. Id. at 600-01.
25. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2190 (1992). For a discussion
of Dr. Machain's claims see ifra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
26. Alvarez-Machiin, 112 S. Ct. at 2191-97. For an analysis of the Supreme Court's
opinion, see infra notes 198-234 and accompanying text.
27. Alvare2-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2197. For historical support for the Court's
conclusions with respect to the legality of abductions under the Constitution and the
U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty, 'see iqfra notes 41-108 and accompanying text.
28. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2196. For a discussion on the inapplicability of
general international law in domestic courts, see infra notes 127-39, 222-34 and ac-
companying text.
1507
law enforcement.' This, however, only partly explains the Court's re-
fusal to apply general international law principles to executive ac-
tions.30 It seems equally clear that the Court is wary of engaging in the
interpretation of a morass of international law principles, which by
their nature tend to be ill-defined and ambiguous."' In essence, the
Court's opinion reflects its desire to escape the inherent political ten-
sion and legal uncertainty surrounding cases injected with a heavy ele-
ment of foreign relations.' As a result, the Supreme Court's decision
afforded the executive branch significant discretion in the arena of
international law enforcement.' Whether the Bush Administration
wisely exercised that discretion by adopting an official policy of uni-
lateral abductions is another matter-a policy matter better left to the
annals of Foreign Relations than the pages of a law review article."
Therefore, the focus of this article is on the legality of official abduc-
tions under the United States Constitution and American jurisprudence
rather than on the propriety of abductions under normative or moral
standards.
Part I of this Note examines the legal history behind the Supreme
Court's opinion, including the 107-year-old Ker-Frisbie doctrine which
prevents criminal defendants from challenging the judicial jurisdiction
29. See infra notes 41-108, 127-39 and accompanying text.
30. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2195-97; see also infra notes 127-39 and ac-
companying text
31. See Michael R. Pontoni, Comment, Authority of the United States to
ExtraterritoriaUy Apprehend and Lawfully Prosecute International Drug Trffwkers
and Other Fugitives, 21 CAL . T'L LJ. 215, 235-36 (1991) (stating that cases impli-
cating international or political matters are better addressed by the executive branch).
32. See id. at 235-38 (discussing cases that address separation of powers); see also
discussion on separation of powers principle, ifra notes 126, 139 and accompanying
text.
33. See Pontoni, supra note 31, at 233-39. For commentary on the unique political
and diplomatic factors that the executive branch must consider before gaining custo-
dy of criminals abroad, see infra notes 311-45 and accompanying text.
34. The negative impact of the Bush Administration's abduction policy on foreign
affairs and international cooperation in law enforcement is clear. See infra notes 338-
45, 359-62 and accompanying text. Then President-elect Clinton publicly questioned
the legality of unilateral abductions as an official practice. Clinton, High Court Differ
on Abduction, LA. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1992, at A32. On the other hand, the President's
ability to act unilaterally is an essential prerogative, and one that should not be ced-
ed easily. The Alvarez-Machain Decision, 3 U.S. DEPT ST. DISPATCH 614(3) (1992)
(statement by Deputy Legal Adviser Alan J. Kreczko before the House Subcommittee
on Civil and Constitutional Rights); see also infra notes 345-50, 358 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the need for executive discretion). Because the debate over offi-
cial abductions involves serious political considerations, the Court perhaps correctly
left resolution of the dispute to the political branches of the government. See
Pontoni, supra note 31, at 235-39.
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of a United States court." Part HI also points out the recognized excep-
tions to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine and emphasizes the treaty violation
exception and relevant principles of international law that Dr. Machan
relied upon in Alvarez-Machain.' Part m discusses the facts sur-
rounding the abduction of Dr. Machan and outlines the procedural
history of the case." Part IV briefs the Court's opinion in Alvarez-
Machain and presents the two vastly different positions taken by the
majority and dissenting opinions.' Part V discusses the impact of the
Court's decision on domestic and international law, and on the
executive policies for securing custody of criminals abroad.' Finally,
part VI reviews both sides of the ongoing controversy regarding the
Alvarez-Machain decision and concludes that the need to preserve
executive discretion in international law enforcement justifies the
Court's decision.'
n. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine
The Supreme Couit first addressed the issue of international abduc-
tions over 100 years ago in Ker v. Il/inois."1 Until United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, Ker represented the Court's last word on the legality
of extraterritorial seizures under both the United States Constitution
and applicable treaty law.'
In Ker, a United States citizen, living in Peru, was wanted for larceny
in Ilinois.' The State Department directed a Pinkerton agent to "re-
ceive" Ker from the Peruvian authorities in compliance with the extradi-
tion treaty between the United States and Peru." Instead of presenting
extradition papers to the Peruvian authorities, the agent kidnapped Ker
and placed him on a ship bound for Honolulu.' Ker was eventually
35. See iifra notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 55-152 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 164-97 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 198-278 and accompanying text
39. See infra notes 279-350 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 351-64 and accompanying text
41. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
42. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2192 (1992).
43. Ker, 119 U.S. at 437-38.
44. L at 438; United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 277 (2d Cir. 1974).
45. Ker, 119 U.S. at 438.
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handed over to Illinois authorities and convicted in state court.'
The Supreme Court faced two questions on appeal: first, whether Ker
could successfully challenge the trial court's jurisdiction by arguing that
his abduction violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment; and second, whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction
because Ker's apprehension did not comply with the provisions of the
United States-Peru extradition treaty." As to Ker's constitutional claim,
the Court held that because both the indictment and trial conducted
against Ker were proper, the defendant's rights to due process were
fully satisfied." As to Ker's claim under the extradition treaty, the
Court found that the treaty had not been invoked because the agent
failed to present the extradition papers to the Peruvian authorities, and
thus, the agent did not initiate the extradition process.' It is clear then
46. Id. at 438-39.
47. Id. at 439-41.
48. Id, at 440. The Court applied the following definition of due process:
The 'due process of law' here guaranteed is compiled with when the party is
regularly indicted by the proper grand jury in the State court, has a trial
according to the forms and modes prescribed for such trials, and when, in
that trial and proceedings, he is deprived of no rights to which he is lawfully
entitled.
Id.
Since Ker, the meaning of due process has evolved significantly. Over the years,
defendants have gained considerable protections against Improper police conduct during
arrests. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488-91 (1963) (finding that
an illegal arrest "tainted" a subsequent confession rendering the confession inadmissi-
ble); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961) (making the exclusionary rule applica-
ble to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 172-73 (1952) (holding that police conduct which "shocks the conscience" violates
a defendant's due process rights).
However, the courts do not follow this trend of heightened protection when ar-
rests occur outside United States territory. See Downing, supm note 15, at 583-84. In
these cases, the rule of Ker controls, and the courts repeatedly hold that extraterritori-
al arrests, however they are effected, do not violate due process as long as the judicial
process affords the defendant a proper indictment and fair trial. See, e.g., United States
v. Wilson, 732 F.2d 404, 411 (6th Cir.) (upholding an arrest made after federal agents
duped the defendant onto a plane bound for the United States), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1099 (1984); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 902 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that
defendant's abduction from Bimini pursuant to an arrest warrant did not constitute a
violation of due process); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1259 (5th Cr. 1978)
(upholding a warrantless search and seizure on the high seas), overruled by United
States v. Michelena-Orovio, 719 F. 2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983). But see United States v.
Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 276 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding a violation of the defendant's due
process rights when Brazilian and American law enforcement agents detained the de-
fendant in Brazil and brutally tortured him). For a complete discussion of the
Constitution's application to government agents overseas, see Downing, supra note 15,
at 577-86.
49. Ker, 119 U.S. at 442-43. The Court characterized the arresting agent's behavior
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that Ker establishes that unless the defendant proves an improper in-
dictment, an unfair trial, or that his abduction violates the express pro-
visions of an extradition treaty, the defendant may not challenge a
court's jurisdiction.'
Sixty-six years later, in Frisbie v. Collins,"1 the Supreme Court unan-
imously reaffirmed Ker and extended its application to domestic
kidnappings by state agents.' Citing Ker, the Court again held that
such abductions do not offend notions of due process, even when the
kidnappers are state officers acting under government authority.'
as follows:
[Alithough Julian went to Peru with the necessary papers to procure the
extradition of Ker under the treaty, those papers remained in his pocket and
were never brought to light in Peru; that no steps were taken under them;
and that Julian, in seizing ... Ker and carrying him out of the territory of
Peru into the United States, did not act nor profess to act under the treaty.
In fact, that treaty was not called into operation, was not relied upon, was
not made the pretext of arrest, and the facts show that it was a clear case
of kidnaping [sic] within the dominions of Peru, without any pretense of
authority under the treaty or from the government of the United States.
Id,
50. See Ker, 119 U.S. at 440-44. It is on this point that the courts have diverged.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Alvarez-Machain, the Ninth Circuit took a
narrow view of Ker by limiting its application to abductions conducted by private in-
dividuals and not to abductions involving government officials. See, e.g., United States
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1346 (9th Cir. 1991)(relying on dicta from Ford v.
United States, 273 U.S. 593, 605-06 (1927), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992)). Other
circuits, and most recently the Supreme Court, interpret Ker far more broadly, and
hold that the rule applies to all extraditions whether conducted by private individuals
or state agents. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2197 (1992);
United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 985-86 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825
(1975); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 279 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v.
Sobell, 244 F.2d 520, 525 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957).
51. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
52. Id. at 522-23. Frisbie was living in Chicago when Michigan policemen forcibly
seized, handcuffed, blackiacked, and transported him to Michigan where he was tried
for murder. Id. at 520. Frisbie claimed that his abduction violated his due process
rights and that his trial and conviction violated the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201. Id. As to the latter claim, the Court could not find any provision .within the
federal statute that bars a state from prosecuting persons abducted out of state by
its officers. Id. at 523. Frisbie was not the first time that the Court applied Ker to
interstate abduction cases. See, e.g., Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192, 212-13 (1906)
(holding that although an out of state abduction was "a wrong" upon the defendant,
it could not void the court's jurisdiction); Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700, 715 (1888)
(finding that the district court correctly refused to void its jurisdiction over a defen-
dant kidnapped in West Virginia and forcibly returned to Kentucky).
53. Prisbie, 342 U.S. at 522. The Court reasoned that "[t]here is nothing in the
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Therefore, the doctrine that emerges from the Ker and Frisbie hold-
ings is that forcible abductions, whether by state agents or private indi-
viduals, do not violate due process. Thus, the only way a defendant can
successfully challenge the court's jurisdiction is by arguing that his
abduction violated the provisions of an extradition treaty.'
B. The Toscanino Exception-Abductions That "Shock the
Conscience" and Invoke Due Process
In the area of extraterritorial arrests, the Ker rule stood unquestioned
until 1974 when the Second Circuit, in United States v. Toscanino,'
recognized that the manner in which the defendant is abducted may
void a court's jurisdiction in some circumstances.
In Toscanino, Brazilian officers kidnapped Toscanino from his home
in Uruguay and tortured him for seventeen days in Brazil before flying
him to the United States, where he was wanted for drug trafficking. 7
The appellate court held that in light of such extraordinary brutality,
Ker was inapplicable, and if Toscanino could prove involvement by U.S.
government officials, he should be released as a matter of "fundamental
fairness." ' The Second Circuit based its conclusion on the Supreme
Court's broad interpretation of due process for cases involving "shock-
Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to
escape justice because he was brought to trial against his will." Id.
54. See Abramovsky, supra note 13, at 156-60. Like its interpretation of Ker, the
Ninth Circuit takes an equally narrow view of Frisbie, limiting its holding to domes-
tic, and not international, abductions. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d
1341, 1347 (1991), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992).
55. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
56. Id. at 272-75.
57. Id. at 270. Toscanino alleged that-
[His] captors denied him sleep and all forms of nourishment for days at a
time. Nourishment was provided intravenously in a manner precisely equal to
an amount necessary to keep him alive .... [He] was forced to walk up
and down a hallway for seven or eight hours at a time. When he could no
longer stand he was kicked and beaten .... When he would not answer,
his fingers were pinched with metal pliers. Alcohol was flushed into his eyes
and nose and other fluids .. were forced up his anal passage ....
[Algents of the United States government attached electrodes to Toscanino's
earlobes, toes, and genitals. Jarring jolts of electricity were shot throughout
his body, rendering him unconscious for indeterminate periods ....
Id. at 270. At trial, the government prosecutor did not affirm or deny Toscanino's alle-
gations, but instead claimed that they were immaterial to the court's jurisdiction over
the defendant Id.
58. Id. at 275, 281. In fact, Toscanino was never released. On remand, the district
court held that he failed to prove participation by U.S. officials, and thus, the court
retained jurisdiction. United States v. Toscanino, 398 F. Supp. 916, 917 (E.D.N.Y.
1975).
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ing" police misconduct.' Modem Supreme Court cases apply the
exclusionary rule to evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, and this also influenced the Toscanino court's decision.'
However, the Second Circuit went further than prior Supreme Court
decisions by extending the exclusionary rule to the body of the defen-
dant.61
Although various federal courts have acknowledged the Toscanino
59. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 274. The appellate court relied heavily on the Supreme
Court's decision in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), which established that
police conduct may violate a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process
when the conduct is so brutal that it "shocks the conscience." Toscanino, 500 F.2d at
273. For another Second Circuit case explaining the history and rational behind the
exception, see United States ex re. Lugan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65-66 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1974).
In addition to the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit has also adopted this excep-
tion. See United States v. Lovato, 520 F.2d 1270, 1271 (9th Cir.) (per curiam) (holding
that to fit within the exception a defendant must make "a strong showing of grossly
cruel and unusual barbarities inflicted upon him by persons who can be characterized
as paid agents of the United States"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985 (1975); United States
v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 605 (C.D. Cal. 1990), offd sub. nom. United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct 2188 (1992).
The Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits reject the Toscanino exception. See
Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 261 (7th Cr.) (rejecting the Toscanino
exception as "of ambiguous constitutional origins"), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 878 (1990);
United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508, 1531 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1100 (1985); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 986-87 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 825 (1975).
60. See Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 272-75; see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (applying the exclusionary rule to confessions or leads obtained
from those confessions resulting from police behavior that violated the Fourth
Amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule
to illegal searches or seizures by state officers in a state criminal trial); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that evidence acquired by an illegal
search may not be admitted against the defendant in a federal court).
61. See Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275. After stating the rationale behind the
exclusionary rule-deterrence of official misconduct and preservation of judicial in-
tegrity-the court concluded that
Where suppression of evidence will not suffice, however, we must be guided
by the underlying principle that the government should be denied the right to
exploit its own illegal conduct, and when an accused is kidnapped and forc-
ibly brought within the jurisdiction, the court's acquisition of power over his
person represents the fruits of the government's exploitation of. its own mis-
conduct
Id. (citation omitted). For an excellent discussion on the history and rationale of the
Toscanino exception, see Gentin, supra note 15, at 1238-43.
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exception, no court has actually applied it.' Instead, courts either flat-
ly refuse to recognize such an exception, or dismiss the defendant's
claim for lack of proof that U.S. agents participated in the alleged bru-
tality.' Additionally, Supreme Court decisions that were decided after
Toscanino clearly reject any expansion of the exclusionary rule to in-
clude the defendant's own body." For example, in United States v.
Crews,M the Court held that the body of a defendant is never suppress-
ible as the fruit of an unlawful arrest.' The Court reasoned that any
deterrent effect gained by voiding jurisdiction could not outweigh the
paramount public interest in bringing the guilty to trial." In sum, not
only do courts rarely consider the Toscanino exception applicable, but
subsequent Supreme Court holdings cast considerable doubt on that
exception's validity. As a result, a defendant's due process claim will
rarely defeat the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, and therefore, the rule stating
that abductions alone do not divest a trial court of jurisdiction stands
unchallenged.'
62. Abramovsky, supra note 13, at 159.
There are two primary reasons why courts have refused to apply the excep-
tion. First, they have opined that in the cases before them the alleged con-
duct was not of such enormity as to trigger the "shock the conscience" doc-
trine. Second, even when presented with medical evidence which supports
the defendant's allegation and might amount to such egregious conduct, de-
fendants have been unable to persuade the court that U.S. law enforcement
agents actively participated in such conduct
Id. (footnote omitted).
On remand, Toscanino was unable to prove his allegations. Toscanino, 398 F.
Supp. at 917; see also United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 71 (2d Cir.) (Chilean police
tortured and interrogated the defendant but the court found no evidence that the DEA
agent participated in or acquiesced to the torture), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 847 (1975);
United States v. Degollado, 696 F. Supp. 1136, 1140 (S.D. Tex. 1988) (finding that the
defendant failed to substantiate U.S. involvement in the torture carried out by Mexican
police).
63. See Abramovsky, supra note 13, at 159.
64. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 (1984) (rejecting the
defendant's objection to being summoned to a deportation hearing following his alleg-
edly unlawful arrest); United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980) ("Insofar as
respondent challenges his own presence at trial, he cannot claim immunity from pros-
ecution simply because his appearance in court was precipitated by an unlawful ar-
rest."); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976) ("[Jludicial proceedings need not
abate when the defendant's person is unconstitutionally seized.").
For a complete discussion of these cases and their effect on the Toscanino
exception, see Gentin, supra note 15, at 1238-43.
65. 445 U.S. 463 (1980).
66. Id. at 474.
67. Id. at 474 n.20 (quoting United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966)).
68. Gentin, supra note 15, at 1242.
Although defendants have not been successful in challenging a court's jurisdic-
tion due to an illegal arrest, the exclusionary rule still allows for the exclusion of
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C. Treaty Violation Exception to Ker-Frisbie
Although the Ker-Frisbie doctrine stands as a formidable barrier to a
defendant seeking relief for his wrongful abduction, the doctrine is not
entirely invincible. If a binding extradition treaty exists between two
nations,' a defendant may assert that the kidnapping violated the trea-
evidence obtained as a result of the police misconduct. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (applying the exclusionary rule to all "fruit" of the
illegal search).
However, If the defendant is a nonresident alien and is living outside the United
States, the exclusionary rule is not available. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990) (admitting evidence seized by U.S. officials from the
defendant's home in Mexico despite a violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights). In refusing to apply the Fourth Amendment, the Court reasoned that "the
people protected by the Fourth Amendment ... refers to a class of persons who are
part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection
with this country to be considered part of that community." Id. at 265 (citing United
States ex e. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904)). In contrast, other consti-
tutional rights, such as the right against self-incrimination (Fifth Amendment) and
rights to a fair trial and an attorney (Sixth Amendment), are applicable to all defen-
dants, regardless of nationality. Id. at 265-66; United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp.
909, 924-26, 928-29 (D.D.C.) (defendant's Fifth Amendment Miranda right and Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attached at outset of his interrogation, more than 4,000
miles from United States), rev'd on other grounds, 859. F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
The distinction between Fourth Amendment rights and Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ment rights is based on the Fourth Amendment's extension of rights to "the people,"
interpreted to mean "persons who are part of a national community." Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265. In contrast, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments extend their
rights to the "person" and the "accused," interpreted to mean anyone. See id. at 265-
66. For a complete discussion of the Bill of Rights' application to the actions of
United States officers abroad, see Downing, supra note 15, at 583-86; Lowenfeld H,
supra note 15, at 449-59.
69. Treaties .come in two forms: executory and self-executing. United States v.
Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 875 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); see also Cook
v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933) (defining attributes of self-executing
treaties). Self-executing treaties become "the supreme Law of the Land," and thus
binding in United States courts immediately after being signed by the President and
approved by two-thirds of the Senate. See U.S. CoNST. art VI (giving treaties the
force of federal law); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (giving the President the power to enter
into treaties subject to Senate approval); Cook, 288 U.S. at 119. However, executory
treaties do not have the force of law until Congress passes implementing federal
legislation. Pontoru, supra note 31, at 229. Whether a treaty is executory or self-exe-
cuting is a matter of interpretation for the court, and generally depends on the intent
of the signatory states. Postal, 589 F.2d at 876; Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848,
851 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Pontonm, supra note 31, at 229 (citing REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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ty and thus divests the court of its jurisdiction."0 However, to prevail
on such a claim, the defendant must first have standing to object to the
treaty violation.1 A defendant obtains standing either by an express
treaty provision or by an objection from the asylum state.12 The defen-
dant must also prove that state law enforcement agents, as opposed to
private individuals, violated the treaty."m
Therefore, given the existence of a valid extradition treaty, a defen-
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 154(1) (1965)). By their nature,
extradition treaties are self-executing and are enforceable without the aid of imple-
menting legislation. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp 599, 606 (C.D. Cal.
1990) (citing 1 M. CHERIF BASSIouNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAw
& PRACTICE 71-74 (2d rev. ed. 1987)), off d sub nom. United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
70. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2193 (1992) (recognizing that
when the arrest by government agents violates a binding extradition treaty, the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine is inapplicable and a court may divest itself of jurisdiction); Cook v.
United States, 288 U.S. 102, 121 (1932) (same); Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593,
606 (1927) (same).
71. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1349 n.9 (1991), vacated, 112
S. Ct. 2986 (1992); Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 607-08. For further discussion on
the standing requirement, see ifra notes 109-26, 288-91 and accompanying text.
72. Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 260 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
878 (1990) (holding that a court may not hear alleged government violations of inter-
national law without an official protest from the offended government); United States
v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding a that defendant lacks stand-
ing to raise treaty violations absent protest from a treaty signatory);. United States v.
Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 902 (2d Cir. 1981) (same).
73. See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 121 (1933); United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1346 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 112 S. CL 2986 (1992); Crystle,
supra note 15, at 398.
For a court to find a violation of an extradition treaty, the defendant must show
"state action." Id. Showing state action is also essential to a successful invocation of
the Toscanino due process exception. Id. If the arresting party is a state official,
state action is clear. If the party is a private individual, generally no state action
exists unless the defendant proves that the state incited, encouraged, or induced the
private individual to make the arrest Id. at 398-401; United States v. Caro-Quintero,
745 F. Supp. 599, 609 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (citing 1 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADmON: UNIrED STATES LAW & PRACTCE 216 (2d rev. ed. 1987)), offd sub nom.
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2188
(1992). Government-paid bounty hunters fall into this latter category. United States v.
Lovato, 520 F.2d 1270, 1271 (9th Cir.) (finding torture inflicted by paid agents
amounts to state action), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985 (1975); Caro-Quintero, 745 F.
Supp at 609.
Interestingly, if Ker had been decided under modem state action rules, Ker's
arrest by a state-hired agent would amount to state action. Crystle, supra note 15, at
398-99. Nonetheless, the court would have retained jurisdiction because the abduction
did not violate any provisions of the extradition treaty with Peru. See United States
v. Alvarez-Machain 112 S. CL 2188, 2193-95 (1992); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 443-
44 (1886).
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dant seeking to utilize the treaty exception need only affirmatively an-
swer two questions: first, whether the government's conduct violates
the treaty provisions;74 and second, whether the foreign defendant has
standing to object to the court's jurisdiction by virtue of an express
treaty provision or a formal protest from the asylum state."6
1. Violation of an Extradition Treaty's Express Provision
When the defendant proves that the arrest or search violates an ex-
press term of a binding treaty, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that jurisdiction is void and that the case must be dismissed.6
In Cook v. United States," the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether the United States Government could assess a penalty on a
British ship for carrying alcoholic beverages in violation of prohibition
laws.' In Cook, customs agents discovered the illegal cargo when they
boarded the ship eleven and a half miles off shore.' However, a 1924
treaty signed between the United States and Britain provided that
boarding rights could not be exercised more than ten miles off shore.'
The Court held that because the treaty confined the government's
authority to seize vessels to a ten mile zone, the government "lacked
power" to seize the defendant's vessel and thus "lacked power" to "sub-
ject the vessel to our laws."8 As a result, the trial court lacked juris-
diction to try the defendant, and could not apply the rule of Ker.'
2. Violation of an Implied Provision-Violation of the Treaty's
Object and Purpose
Cases like Cook, in which the government action violated an express
74. See infra notes 76-108 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 109-126 and accompanying text.
76. See United States v. Alvarez-Machan, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2193 (1992) (recognizing
that a violation of an extradition treaty precludes the application of the Ker doc-
trine); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 121 (1933) (same); Ford v. United States,
273 U.S. 593, 606 (1927) (same).
77. 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
78. Id at 107.
79. Id.
80. Id. See id. at 110-11 (stating that vessels could only be boarded within United
States territorial waters).
81. Id. at 121. "To hold that adjudication may follow a wrongful seizure would go
far to nullify the purpose and effect of the Treaty." Id. at 121-22.
82. Id. at 120-22.
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provision of an extradition treaty, are rare." More commonly, the gov-
ernment makes an extraterritorial arrest or seizure that does not invoke
any particular treaty provision, but rather violates an implied term of
the agreement.' In such cases, the defendant's only claim may be that
such government action specifically defeats the treaty's underlying ob-
ject or purpose.'
Ironically, in United States v. Rauscher,' a case decided the same
day as Ker, the Supreme Court implied a term into a U.S.-Britain extra-
dition treaty and held that the United States government's violation of
that term prevented the trial court from exercising its jurisdiction.'
Rauscher was extradited to the United States from Great Britain on
charges of murder on the high seas.' Upon arrival, Rauscher was also
charged with the lesser offense of inflicting cruel and unusual punish-
ment on a fellow crew member.' No provision in the extradition trea-
ty expressly limited the prosecution's power to charge a defendant with
an offense other than one listed in the extradition request.' After ex-
amining the treaty's provisions, conflicting case law, and commentary
83. See id. at 102, 121; Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 616 (1927) (failing to
decide whether. a United States Coast Guard ship seizure violated an express provi-.
sion of a treaty between United States and Great Britain because the defendant
waived the issue at the trial court level).
84. See Abramovsky, supra note 13, at 153-56. There are a variety of reasons why
governments choose not to invoke extradition treaties and instead resort to irregular
means to apprehend suspects. First, extradition treaties are the slowest and most
costly means of rendition. See id. at 155. Second, in many cases, national laws or
internal politics of the asylum state prohibit extradition despite the existence of an
extradition mechanism. Id. at 155 n.10; see also discussion of extradition difficulties,
iqfra notes 314-24 and accompanying text.
85. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Alvarez-Machain, federal courts were
split on the issue of whether abductions violate the underlying purposes of extradi-
tion treaties. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1349-51 (9th
Cir. 1991) (holding that abductions frustrate the object and purpose of U.S.-Mexico
extradition treaty), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992); United States v. Caro-Quintero,
745 F. Supp. at 599, 609-610 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (same), ofd sub. num. 946 F.2d 1466
(9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992). But see, e.g., Matta-Ballesteros ex reL
Stolar v. Henman, 697 F. Supp. 1040, 1044 (S.D. III. 1988) (holding that abduction
alone, absent a protest from the asylum state, does not give the defendant a right to
claim a treaty violation), atffd, 896 F.2d 225 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 209
(1990); United States v. Sobell, 244 F.2d 520, 525 (2d Cir.) (holding that an illegal
abduction did not violate the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
873 (1957); Ex parte Lopez, 6 F. Supp. 342, 344 (S.D. Tex. 1934) (deferring the ques-
tion of whether an abduction violated an extradition treaty to the executive branch).
86. 119 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1886).
87. Id. Justice Miller authored both Ker and Rauscher.
88. Id. at 409-10.
89. Id. at 409.
90. Id. at 422.
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from international law experts, Justice Miller found that the treaty im-
pliedly limited prosecution to offenses for which the defendant was
extradited." This implied provision, now widely incorporated in all
extradition treaties, is the principle of "specialty."" However, the
Rauscher Court's more important contribution is in demonstrating that
governments may violate both implicit and explicit terms of an extradi-
tion treaty. 3 Although courts agree that implicit terms may exist, they
differ markedly in their willingness to find such terms."
a. The Ninth Circuit view-implying a term that the extradition
treaty is the exclusive means of rendition
Some courts, particularly the Ninth Circuit, find an implied provision
that the extradition mechanism is the exclusive means of rendition, and
therefore other means, such as abductions, are prohibited.' These
91. Id. at. 429-30. The Court concluded that "a person who has been brought with-
in the jurisdiction of the court by virtue of proceedings under an extradition treaty
can only be tried for one of the offenses described in that treaty, and for the of-
fence with which he is charged in the proceedings for his extradition ... " Id. at
430.
92. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2191 (1992). For further
discussion of this principle, see generally Kenneth E. Levitt, Note, International Ex-
tradition, The Principle of Specialty, and Effective Treaty Enforcement, 76 MINN. L
REV. 1017 (1992).
93. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 219.1; United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939
F.2d at 1341, 1348 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992).
94. Compare, Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1349 (taking an expansive view of
treaty interpretation by implying an exclusivity term to extradition treaties) with Unit-
ed States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 877-78 (5th Cir.) (taking a narrow view of treaty
interpretation to deny claim that the treaty was intended to be self-executing), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979). The general guideline for all courts in interpreting a
treaty is that they examine both the text and the "context in which the written
words are used." Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1985).
95. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1349-52. The Supreme Court adopted a 'per-
missive" view of treaty interpretation in Factor v. Laubenheier, 290 U.S. 276 (1933)
by stating:
In choosing between conflicting interpretations of a treaty obligation, a nar-
row and restricted construction is to be avoided as not consonant with the
principles deemed controlling in the interpretation of international agreements.
Considerations which should govern the diplomatic relations between nations,
and the good faith of treaties, as well, require that their obligations should
be liberally construed so as to effect the apparent intentions of the parties to
secure equality and reciprocity between them. For that reason, if a treaty
fairly admits of two constructions, one restricting the rights which may be
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courts begin by arguing that unilateral abductions are inherently incon-
sistent with the fundamental purposes of extradition treaties." They
argue that an extradition treaty's function is to bind the signatory na-
tions to a set of reciprocal promises which serve to safeguard each
nation's sovereignty7 and to ensure the fair treatment of extradited
individuals.' Therefore, because the concept of abductions is antithet-
ical to the protective function of extradition treaties, the only reason-
able conclusion is that such treaties contain an implied provision that
they are the exclusive means of rendition.' Arguably, without this as-
claimed under it, and the other enlarging it, the more liberal construction is
to be preferred.
Id. at 293-94 (citations omitted).
96. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1349-50. In United States v. Caro-Quintero,
Judge Rafeedie also adopted the "permissive" approach and explained his rationale in
detail. See United States v: Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 609-10 (C.D. Cal. 1990),
offd sub nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd,
112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992). For a discussion of the Caro-Quintero and Verdugo-Urquidez
opinions, see generally Lowenfeld I, supra note 15.
97. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1350; Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 609-10
(citing I M. CHERIF BAssiouNi, INTERNATIONAL ExTRADION: UNITED STATES LAW AND
PRACTICE 194 (2d rev. ed. 1987)). In Caro-Quintero, Judge Rafeedie based his finding
that extradition treaties are designed to protect territorial sovereignty on the reason-
ing in Rauscher. See Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 609. In Rauscher, Justice Miller
concluded that in all extradition treaties an implied term exists that limits prosecu-
tion to the charges for which the asylum nation granted extradition. United States v.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 419-20 (1886). However, in reaching this conclusion, Justice
Miller did not even mention the principle of territorial sovereignty. See id. Rather, he
based his conclusion on protecting the extraditing. country's inherent right under in-
ternational law to refuse extradition requests in certain circumstances. See id. Justice
Miller found that, absent a treaty obligation, extraditing countries generally refuse
extradition requests unless they contain charges of some specific offense. Id. at 419.
Therefore, to protect this right of refusal, an implied term should exist in all extra-
dition treaties that limits prosecution to the specified charges. Id. In light of this rea-
soning, the analysis in Rauscher does not support Judge Rafeedie's assertion that ex-
tradition treaties exist to protect the sovereignty of signatory nations.
98. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1350; Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 609. In
Verdugo-Urquidez, the court noted that the typical extradition treaty sets forth in
great detail the steps that each nation must take to compel the other to extradite a
particular defendant. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1349. 'For example, it lists the
crimes for which individuals may be extradited and those for which they may not be,
the evidence that must be adduced to obtain extradition, and the method by which
such evidence must be presented." Id. The court eventually held that because the
U.S.-Mexico treaty provided such detailed procedures for acquiring a fugitive and
specific exceptions to the duty to extradite, the manifest intention of the parties was
for the treaty to be the exclusive means to acquire fugitives. Id. at 1350-51. For com-
mentary supporting this view, see generally Lowenfeld I, supra note 15. For an in-
depth criticism of this approach finding that exclusivity defeats the purposes of extra-
dition treaties, see Mitchell J. Matorin, Note, Unchaining'the Law: The Legality of
Extraterritorial Abduction in Lieu of Extradition, 41 DuKE UJ. 907, 910 (1992).
99. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1349-52. The Supreme Court ultimately rejected
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sumption, the treaty's provisions are reduced to meaningless
formalities. '°°
b. The prevailing view-the argument against implying
exclusivity
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit's approach, the Supreme Court and
other commentators take a far narrower view of an extradition treaty's
purpose. T'hey refuse to hold that the treaty is the exclusive means of
rendition or that abductions necessarily violate the treaty.' Under
this view, the fundamental purpose of extradition treaties is to provide
no more than an optional means of assistance in combatting crime.' 2
The reciprocal duties are that if and when the prosecuting country
makes a formal request for a fugitive, the asylum state must deliver the
this interpretation of extradition treaties. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.
Ct. 2188, 2196 n.14 (1992).
The ambitious purpose ascribed to the Treaty by the [Verdugo court], we be-
lieve, places a greater burden on its language and history than they can logi-
cally bear. In a broad sense, most international agreements have the common
purpose of safeguarding the sovereignty of signatory nations, in that they
seek to further peaceful relations between nations. This, however, does not
mean that the violation of any principle of international law constitutes a
violation of this particular treaty.
Id
100. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1350. The Verdugo-Uriquidez court criticized
any other conclusion as illogical. Id. at 1351. Without exclusivity, the court argued
that extradition treaties will be converted from "instruments for arranging orderly
transfers between nations . . . subject to certain agreed-upon limitations set forth in
the treaties, into a license or charter for signatory nations to engage in unlawful
conduct in all those categories of cases in which the treaty prohibits extradition." Id,
at 1351. For this proposition, the Verdugo-Uriquidez court relied heavily on the lan-
guage in Rauscher. See id. United States v. Rauscher 119 U.S. 407, 420-21 (1886)
(finding that the treaty's object and purpose would be utterly frustrated if prosecution
was not limited to the charges specified in the extradition request).
101. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2195 (holding that the language and history be-
hind the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty did not reveal that it was intended as the ex-
clusive means of rendition). For further commentary proposing that extradition trea-
ties are not intended as the exclusive means of rendition, see Matorin, supra note
98, at 912, and infra notes 212-21, 283-87 and accompanying text.
102. See 1 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRINAL LAW 351
(1973) (describing the extradition practices of the United States in general); Matorin,
supra note 98, at 913 ("Extradition treaties are designed to protect neither the sover-
eignty of nations nor the rights of individuals; rather... they exist solely to assist
the states in preventing and punishing crime.")
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suspect' or refuse based on certain exceptions provided for in the
treaty.104 Aside from this conditional obligation, extradition treaties do
not mandate that countries resort exclusively to the extradition mecha-
nism."° Therefore, other means of apprehension, such as abductions,
cannot violate the treaty unless the treaty expressly prohibits them or
provides on its face that the extradition procedures are the exclusive
means of rendition." Thus, some authorities argue that this result is
consistent with the treaty's purpose as a crime fighting device 7
103. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct at 2193 (reasoning that an extradition treaty
only obligates the parties to the extent that the parties seek to invoke its provisions);
United States v. Sobell, 142 F. Supp. 515, 524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (same), qffd, 244
F.2d 520 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957). One commentator noted:
As a result of their history and purpose, two different obligations are im-
posed by extradition treaties. The sole effect on the asylum state is to bind
it to deliver a suspect upon a proper request. If the requesting state fails to
comply with the procedures set forth in the treaty, then the obligation to
comply with the request does not arise. The sole obligation imposed upon
the requesting state is that, if it invokes the extradition treaty, it will try the
extradited suspect for the specific crime charged. An extradition treaty thus
does not create a reciprocal agreement to use the process provided in the
treaty exclusively; rather it creates two unilateral pledges.
Matorin, supra note 98, at 914 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
104. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193-94. Typical provisions in an extradition
treaty that an asylum country may invoke in order to refuse extradition are those
that allow a nation to refuse to turn over a country's own nationals, or defendants
charged with political or capital offenses. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978,
U.S.-Mex., arts. 5, 8 & 9, 31 U.S.T. 5059, 5063-67.
105. Matorin, supra note 98, at 912-17; see also Socith Nationale Industrielle
Ahrospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 534 (1987) (absent explicit
support in the treaty, the Court refused to infer that the contracting states to the
Hague Evidence Convention abandoned their right to resort to pre-treaty measures).
Matorin argued that the rationale of Socidtd may be applied with equal force in inter-
preting the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty because "if the United States and Mexico
had intended to impose mutual obligations to follow the procedures set forth in the
treaty, they could have merely added an explicit statement to that effect." Matorin,
supra note 98, at 921.
106. Matorin, supra note 98, at 920; see also United States v. Alvarez-Machan, 112
S. Ct. 2188, 2195 (1992) (holding that absent any provision on the face of the treaty
or a history of enforcement that concludes otherwise, abductions do not violate ex-
tradition treaties); United States v. Sobell, 244 F.2d 520, 524-25 (2d Cir.) (same), cert,
denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957).
107. Matorin, supra note 98, at 915. Others criticize the "treaty as exclusive means"
approach because it attempts to "convert the treaty from a crime-fighting device into
a straitjacket for law enforcement agencies. Exclusivity would open up the law en-
forcement arena to political and diplomatic forces that would undermine the efficien-
cy of the fight against crime." Id. If a treaty's goal is to facilitate law enforcement
procedures, one should not assume that the government intended to constrain itself
or other nations in their fight against crime; rather, the assumption should be that
each nation retains its freedom to arrest fugitives abroad using whatever means it
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meant only as an optional aid to law enforcement agencies."
c. Defendant's standing to object-adequate protest by the asylum
state
In addition to showing a treaty violation, the defendant must also
demonstrate his or her standing to object to the violation." An ex-
deem$ most efficient and desirable. See id. at 916. The treaty merely provides govern-
ments with an alternative to formal extradition procedures should they wish to avoid
that more diplomatically volatile means of abduction. See id. at 922.
108. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193-94. The assumption that governments
do not intend to close off other means of apprehension recognizes that the extradi-
tion process is not fail-safe. See Matorin, supra note 98, at 916; Abramovsky, supra
note 13, at 154-55. This is particularly true with treaties between the United States
and its Latin American partners. See Abramovsky, supra note 13, at 155 n.10. Despite
having extradition treaties with the United States, several Latin American countries
refuse to extradite their own nationals. See, e.g., Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct at 2193-
94 (noting that the U.S.-Mexlco extradition treaty gives Mexico the right to refuse the
extradition of its own nationals as long as Mexico submits the case to its own au-
thorities); Matta-Ballesteros ex ret. Stolar v. Henman, 697 F. Supp. 1040, 1044 (S.D.
Ill. 1988) (concluding that an extradition request would have failed because the Hon-
duran Constitution prohibits extradition of nationals), acffd, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990); Abramovsky, supra note 13, at 155 n.10 (noting
that the Colombian Supreme Court declared the extradition of Colombian nationals
unconstitutional). In other cases, the demand for extradition may be futile given the
defendant's ability to bribe government officers or otherwise intimidate the foreign
government into refusing extradition. See Abramovsky, supra note 13, at 155. Thus,
law enforcement agents' ability to resort to alternative means of apprehension is
necessary for those cases in which corruption and intimidation prevent the asylum
country from bringing a criminal to justice. See Matorin, supra note 98, at 914-15.
For further commentary on the difficulties of formal extradition, see infra notes 314-
24 and accompanying text.
109. United States v. Verdugo-Urqudez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1355-56 (9th Cir. 1991), va-
cated, 112 S. Ct 2986 (1992); United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 607-08
(C.D. Cal. 1990), affd sub nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machan, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th
Cir. 1991), revd, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992). The rule that a defendant lacks standing to
object unless the offended nation protests the abduction stems from the concept that
treaties are contracts respecting the rights of nations, not individuals. United States v.
Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 37-38 (1st Cir. 1981); United States ex re. Luan v. Gengler,
510 F.2d 62, 67-68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975); Caro-Quintero, 745 F.
Supp. at 607; Matta-BaUlesteros, 697 F. Supp. at 1043. Thus, when a treaty violation
occurs, the contracting foreign government, not the defendant, has the right to com-
plain about the violation. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 607 (citing Cordero, 668
F.2d at 38);. see also United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp 909, 915-16 (D.D.C.) (pre-
cluding the defendant from objecting to alleged violations of the U.S.-Lebanon extradi-
tion treaty absent official objections from Lebanon), rev'd on other grounds, 859 F.2d
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press provision in the treaty, or more commonly, adequate protest by
the asylum state confers such standing."0 Without a government's ob-
jection, courts assume that the asylum state acquiesces to the treaty
violation."' The rule is based on the concept that treaties are con-
tracts between nations designed to further the sovereign interests of the
state rather than the interests of the individual." 2
Federal courts disagree over the type of protest that is considered
953 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 902 (2d Cir. 1981)
("[Aibsent protest or objection by the offended sovereign, Reed has no standing to
raise a violation of international law as an issue."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 432 cmt. c (1987) ("The state from
which the person was abducted may demand return of the person, and international
law requires that he be returned. If the state ... does not demand his return, under
the prevailing view the abducting state may proceed to prosecute him under its
laws."); id. at 902 cmt. a ("Ordinarily, claims for violation of an international obli-
gation may be made only by the state to whom the obligation is owed.").
110. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1355-56. The concept that a defendant may have
a private right to assert a treaty violation stbms from the Supreme Court's holding in
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 424 (1886), which held that an individual
defendant has standing to allege a violation of the principle of specialty. See discus-
sion on Rauscher, supra notes 86-93, 97 and accompanying text. The Court reasoned
that because the U.S.-Britian treaty was self-executing and assumed the status of
federal law, the citizens of the signatory countries could claim certain rights "growing
out of the treaty." Id. at 418-19. One of those rights was the right to be tried only
for those charges specified in the extradition request. Id. at 420. As the Verdugo-
Uriquidez court noted, although many circuits recognize a defendant's right to assert
a violation of specialty, no court recognizes a private right to assert other treaty
violations absent adequate protest by the asylum state. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at
1346-47. The Verdugo-Uriquidez court held that in abductions, the offended govern-
ment must at least file a formal protest. Id. at 1356. Other cases firmly support the
formal protest requirement for conferring individual standing. See supra note 103.
111. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1352-53; Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 611-12.
This assumption is necessary to allow signatory nations the option to silently acqui-
esce to treaty violations. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1352; see also Matorin,
supra note 98, at 914 (discussing the Verdugo court's conclusions). As in contract
law, nations may decide not to hold the breaching party liable for a breach of the
agreement. See, e.g., United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Thai-
land initiated, aided and acquiesced in Valot's removal to the United States."); Matta-
Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 260 (7th Cir.) ("Without an official protest, we
cannot conclude that Honduras has objected to Matta's arrest."), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 898 (1990); Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 208 n.9 (3rd Cir. 1975) ("The
pleadings do not allege that Canada has objected in any way to the removal of Waits
to this country.").
112. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 607 (holding that the defendant's standing to
assert a violation of international law must be accompanied by a protest from the of-
fended government because individual rights arising out of international law are only
derivative through the states); Matta-BaUesteros, 697 F. Supp. at 1043 (same); 668
F.2d at 37-38 (same); Gengler, 510 F.2d at 67-68 (same).
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sufficient to void a court's jurisdiction." Generally, a mere complaint
about the abduction is insufficient; instead, the state must explicitly
demand the defendant's repatriation."'
Some courts, the Ninth Circuit in particular, require only that the
offended government formally protest the abduction."5 In United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,"6 Mexico made a formal complaint three
months after the abduction, and requested notification to U.S. judicial
authorities."7 The appellate court, in finding sufficient grounds for a
dismissal, indicated that an official protest alone is enough."' In Unit-
ed States v. Caro-Quintero,"9 the Alvarez case at the district court
level, Mexico immediately protested the abduction as a violation of the
extradition treaty and demanded the defendant's return."2 The district
court ultimately held, in accord with Verdugo, that official protest to
the abduction, and not an explicit demand for repatriation, was suffi-
cient to confer standing.'
113. See Matorin, supra note 98, at 926 and n.92.
114. RESTATEMENT (THa), supra note 109, at § 432 cmt. c ("If the state from
which the person was abducted does not demand his return, under the prevailing
view the abducting state may proceed to prosecute him under its laws."); see also
Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1365 (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting) (dissent-
ing from the assertion that a mere formal protest by the offended government is
sufficient, because "under international practice a nation's protest that its treaty rights
have been violated . .. does not in itself constitute an objection to the defendant's
trial or a demand for his return").
115. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1360 n.22 ("None of the principal cases discuss-
ing derivative standing suggests that anything more than a formal protest is re-
quired."); Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 260 (7th Cir.) (requiring "an of-
ficial protest"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990); Gengler, 510 F.2d at 67 n.8 (defen-
dant must prove that the sovereign "registered an official protest with the United
States Department of State").
116. 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992).
117. Id. at 1360.
118. Id. at 1360 n.21.
119. 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1990), afj'd sub. nom. United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
120. Id. at 604.
121. Id. at 608. In contrast to Verdugo-Urquidez and Caro-Quintero, the majority of
cases involving international abduction show an absence of any actual protest by the
foreign government. See, e.g., Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir.)
(finding that the defendant failed to show any protest by the Honduran government),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990); United States v. Zabeneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th
Cir. 1988) (finding neither Guatemala nor Belize protested the defendant's abduction);
United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 1981) (finding that Panama and
Venezuela did not object to the defendant's arrest and deportation); United States v.
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Some authorities criticize the Ninth Circuit approach for ignoring the
possibility that the government protest may not actually be intended to
effect the fugitive's return.'22 Often, protesting nations do not
wish-or are unable-to bring the defendant to trial in their own
courts, but still object to the abduction in order to satisfy internal polit-
ical concerns. '23 Therefore, to ascertain the offended nation's true in-
tent, courts should retain jurisdiction until the foreign country clearly
demands the defendant's repatriation.'"4 Some courts go farther and
deny standing even after a demand for repatriation has been made, re-
garding the alleged treaty violation as a matter purely for the executive
branch.'" Such holdings reflect the traditional tendency of the judicia-
Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 902 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[A]bsent protest or objection by the offend-
ed sovereign, Reed has no standing to raise a violation of international law as an is-
sue."); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67-68 (2d Cir.) (finding no
showing of objection to defendant's abduction by Bolivia or Argentina), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1001 (1975); United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp 909, 915-16 (D.D.C.) (pre-
cluding the defendant from objecting to alleged violations of the U.S.-Lebanon extradi-
tion treaty absent an official objection from Lebanon), rev'd on other grounds, 859
F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
122. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1341, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1991)
(Browning, J., concurring and dissenting), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992); Matorin,
supra note 98, at 929.
123. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1366-67 (Browning, J., concurring and dissent-
ing); see, e.g., Attorney General v. Eichmann, (D.C. Israel 1961) 36 Int'l. L, Rep. 18,
63 (1968), affd, (S. Ct. Israel 1962) 36 Int'l. L. Rep. 277 (1968) (Argentina initially
insisted upon Eichmann's repatriation, but later decided to withdraw its demand as
long as Israel apologized for violating its sovereignty).
124. Matorin, supra note 98, at 929.
125. Jamaica v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 627, 622-23 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (holding
official complaints that the United States violated the U.S.-Jamaica extradition treaty,
and demands for defendant's repatriation must be remedied through the diplomatic
process); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1534 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (holding
that the protest by the former Noriega government in Panama has no effect on the
court's jurisdiction over defendant General Noriega because the United States did not
recognize the Noriega regime as Panama's legitimate government at the time of ar-
rest); Ex parte Lopez, 6 F. Supp. 342, 344 (S.D. Tex. 1934) (holding that a violation
of the extradition treaty and the Mexican government formally demanding the
defendant's repatriation were matters for the executive branch).
Occasionally, a court may assert "universal" jurisdiction over a defendant despite
an official protest to the abduction. Pontoni, supra note 31, at 241; see, e.g., Attorney
General v. Eichmann, 36 Int'l L Rep. 5 (D.C. Jerusalem 1961), affd, 36 Int'l L. Rep.
277 (S. Ct. Israel) (holding that Argentina's objection to the Nazi war criminal's ab-
duction cannot defeat the court's "universal" jurisdiction given the severity of the
defendant's war crimes). Universal jurisdiction holds that some crimes are so univer-
sally condemned that any nation that has custody of the perpetrators may prosecute
them under their laws. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985)
(noting crimes such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, geno-
cide, war crimes, and perhaps terrorism) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RElA-
TIONS LAws OF THE UNITED STATES §404 (1984)), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986). At
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ry-to rely on the separation of powers principle to avoid the more diffi-
cult issues of treaty interpretation."
D. Alternative Theories for Dismissal
1. Violations of Human Rights
Because physical abuse and arbitrary detention commonly accompa-
ny abductions, they usually violate various international covenants pro-
tecting human rights.27 In U.S. courts, however, claims based on such
covenants rarely prevail" because human rights treaties are executo-
least one commentator entertained the possibility of bringing international drug traf-
fickers within the purview of universal jurisdiction. See Pontoni, supra note 31, at
241-42.
126. See Pontoni, supra note 31, at 235-36. Under a separation of powers argument,
courts cite Baker v. Carr for the proposition that the treaty violation is a non-justi-
ciable political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (holding that an
issue is non-justiciable when there are no "judicially discoverable and manageable
standards" or when its proper resolution requires "initial policy determination[s]" bet-
ter left to the political branches). Similarly, a court may argue that certain issues
affecting foreign policy are properly the subject of executive discretion, not judicial
review. See Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111
(1948) (holding that the President's discretionary award of overseas airline routes is
not subject to judicial review).
For a discussion of the Supreme Court's current adoption of this approach, see
infra note 231.
127. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 9(1), adopted De-
cember 19, 1966, effective March 23, 1976 ("Everyone has the right to liberty and
security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds
and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law."). The Human
Rights Committee, which implements the International Covenant, ruled that abductions
constitute arbitrary arrest and detention. Crystle, supra note 15 at 402-04. United
States and China are the only major powers that have not signed this document. Id.
at 402 n.110. See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art 9, signed Dec.
1948, U.N.G.A. Res. 217A. (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); American Convention on Hu-
man Rights, arL 7, signed Nov. 22, 1969, entered into force July 18, 1978, OAS Treaty
Series no. 36, at 1, OAS Official Records OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 23 Doc. 21 Rev. 6 (1979)
("Every person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respect-
ed.-).
128. Crystle, supra note 15, at 403. The executive branch occasionally recognizes
human rights law when forming foreign policy. Under the Carter Administration the
State Department considered certain human rights instruments binding as customary
international law by stating:
There now exists an international consensus that recognizes basic human
rights and obligations owed by all governments to their citizens. This consen-
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ry and do not become law until implemented by the legislature."
Courts employ this same argument to deny judicial enforcement of
various international charters of the United Nations and Organization of
American States," which prohibit member nations from using force
against the territorial integrity of other member states. 1 ' Therefore, in
abduction cases, alleged violations of such charters fail to persuade a
court to divest itself of jurisdiction.'"
sus is reflected in a growing body of international law: The Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights... and other international and regional human rights agreements.
There is no doubt that these rights are often violated; but virtually all gov-
ernments acknowledge their validity.
U.S. DEP'T ST., Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1979 (1980). President
Clinton will probably make the same recognition of Human Rights. See Clinton, High
Court Differ on Abduction, LA. TIMEs, Dec. 16, 1992, at A6.
129. Crystle, supra note 15, at 403. For a commentary on the distinction between
executory and self-executing treaties, see supra note 69.
130. For cases generally indicating the non-binding nature of these conventions, see
Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Ar-
ticles 55 and 56 [of the U.N. Charter] do not create rights enforceable by private
litigants in American courts."); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (reasoning that the U.N. Charter is not "self
executing"), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); see also United States v. Davis, 905
F.2d 245, 248 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990) ("International law principles, standing on their own,
do not create substantive rights or affirmative defenses for litigants in United States
courts."), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 753 (1991).
However, if the provisions of such treaties or charters rise to the level of cus-
tomary international law, some courts may find them enforceable in federal courts.
See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that "several com-
mentators have concluded that the Universal Declaration of [Human Rights) has be-
come, in toto, a part of binding, customary international law"). Customary interna-
tional law is considered part of the federal common law. The Pacquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts.").
131. The United Nations Charter provides: "All Members shall refrain . . . from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity ... of any state." U.N. Charter,
June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, art. 2 paa. 4. Under the O.A.S. Charter,
"[t]he territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporari-
ly . . . of.. .measures of force taken by another state . . . . " O.A.S. Charter, April
30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2934, as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, February 27,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, art. 20[17].
132. See United States ex rel Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir.) (no reme-
dy for alleged violation of international law principles absent protest from the offend-
ed nation), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975). United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F.
Supp. 599, 614 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (rejecting defendant's contention that his abduction
warrants dismissal because it violates the U.N. Charter and the O.A.S. Charter), qffd
sub nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112
S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
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2. Violations of Customary International Law
Unlike their treatment of executory conventions, federal courts con-
sider customary international law"3 as part of the federal common
law and as enforceable when international rights or duties are in-
volved."3
Under customary international law, extraterritorial abductions con-
ducted without the asylum state's consent clearly violate the fundamen-
tal principle of territorial sovereignty."3 Moreover, if the offended
state adequately protests and demands repatriation, international law
requires the offending nation to return the defendant."
133. Customary international law consists of norms created by settled practice and
is regarded as obligatory by two or more states. D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIAS
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (4th ed. 1991); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 109, at
§ 102(2), cmt. b (1987) (stating that such practices may come in the form of diplo-
matic acts as well as silent acquiescence). Although "there is no precise formula to
indicate how widespread a practice must be" to attain customary law status, "it
should reflect wide acceptance among states particularly involved in the relevant ac-
tivity." Id. Once the practice becomes sufficiently accepted to acquire the status of
law, it is binding on all states not objecting to it. Id. at § 102 cmt d. A state may
opt out of customary international law by refusing consent during the law's formative
stage.
134. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 72-73 (1941) ("International law is part of our
law and as such is the law of all States of the Union ... but [it] is a part of our
law for the application of its own principles, and these are concerned with interna-
tional rights and duties and not with domestic rights and duties."); The Pacquete Ha-
bana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts.").
However, the United States Constitution is silent on the applicability of interna-
tional law principles, and leaves the negotiation and ratification of international agree-
ments to the executive and legislative branches. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
135. See Genger, 510 F.2d at 66-67 (concluding that an abduction from another
country without that country's consent violates customary international law); United
States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275-76 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that the abduction
violated a U.N. Charter provision which incorporated the customary international law
principle of territorial sovereignty); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341,
1352 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding a breach of fundamental international law principles in-
corporated in both the U.N. and the O.KS. charters), vacated, 112 S. Ct. '2986 (1992);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 109, at § 432(2) cmt. b (1987) ("It is urn-
versally recognized, as a corollary of state sovereignty, that officials of one state may
not exercise their functions in the territory of another state without the latter's con-
sent."). However, no federal court concludes that a violation of international law
gives a defendant standing to object. See Gengler, 510 F.2d at 67; Caro:Quintero, 745
F. Supp. at 615; Matorin, supra note 98, at 926.
136. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 109, at § 432 cmt. c ("The state from which
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To the contrary, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that alleged
violations of international law do not void a court's jurisdlction,"3
even when the foreign government firmly protests the breach and de-
mands repatriation." The Court reasons that, like violations of execu-
tory treaties, violations of general international law are matters best left
to the executive branch, and therefore fall beyond judicial review."
In conclusion, arguments based on customary international law and
the person was abducted may demand return of the person and international law
requires that he be returned. If the state ... does not demand his return, under the
prevailing view the abduction state may proceed to *prosecute him under its laws.").
137. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2196 (1992); Cook v. United
States, 288 U.S. 102, 121 (1933) (holding that absent a treaty violation, seizures which
violate general international law do not affect a court's jurisdiction); The Merino, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat) 391, 398-401 (1824) (same); The Richmond v. United States, 13 U.S.
(Cranch) 102 (1815) (finding the seizure of vessels within the territorial waters of a
foreign power violates territorial sovereignty, but does not void jurisdiction). Although
federal courts do not void jurisdiction for mere violations of international law, courts
use international law to interpret extradition treaties. See United States v. Rauschei,
119 U.S. 407, 419-20 (1886) (using international law to imply a "specialty" into the
U.S.-Britain extradition treaty); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1352,
(9th Cir. 1991) (stating that international law principles are relevant to the back-
ground assumptions underlying extradition treaties), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992).
But see Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2188, 2196 (refusing to interpret the U.S.-Mexi-
co extradition treaty in light of general international law principles).
In concluding that the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty prohibited unilateral abduc-
tions, the Verdugo-Uriquidez court relied on the principle of territorial sovereignty as
embodied in Article 17 of the O.A.S. Charter and numerous provisions of the U.N.
Charter, noting that the United States and Mexico are signatories to both documents.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1352. The Supreme Court in Alvarez-Machain rejected
this approach, focusing instead on the actual language of the treaty and its history of
enforcement. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2196 n.14.
138. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2196-97; see also Ex parte Lopez, 6 F. Supp.
342, 344 (S.D. Tex. 1934) ("The intervention of the government of Mexico raises seri-
ous questions, involving the claimed violation of its sovereignty, which may well be
presented to the Executive Department of the United States, but of which this court
has no jurisdiction."); Attorney General v. Eichmann, 36 Int'l L Rep. 5 (D.C. Jerusa-
lem 1961), offd, 36 Int'l L Rep. 277 (S. Ct. Israel 1962) (holding that despite official
protest from Argentina, Israeli courts retained universal jurisdiction because the de-
fendant committed international crimes). But see United States v. Noriega, 746 F.
Supp. 1506, 1533-34 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (recognizing that the defendant would have
standing to object to violations of general international law if the offended nation
gave adequate protest).
139. Alvarez-Machamin, 112 S. Ct. at 2196-97; see also Pontoni, supra note 31, at 235-
39. Courts may adopt other reasons for rejecting a violation of international law as a
basis -for voiding its jurisdiction. For example, certain executive acts may override
customary international law. See, e.g., Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1454-55
(11th Cir. 1986) (dismissing an alleged claim of arbitrary detention in violation of
international law because the Attorney General's power to detain aliens indefinitely
preempts international law).
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human rights covenants appear equally ineffective in voiding a court's
jurisdiction, despite the apparent enforceability of customary law in
federal courts.
3. Appealing to the Court's Supervisory Power-A Light That Offers
Little Hope
Although courts defer issues involving political questions to the exec-
utive branch, the courts always retain supervisory powers that can
restrain executive conduct." ° Under this power, the court may sanc-
tion government conduct the court believes is improper but not uncon-
stitutional."' Like the exclusionary rule, one purpose is to preserve
judicial integrity from the taint of the governmental wrongdoing. 4 An-
other purpose is to deter future government misconduct."3
The Supreme Court, however, has limited federal courts' exercise of
supervisory powers and may require that the government wrongdoing
actually be found unconstitutional.'" In United States v. Payner,"
the Court refused to uphold the use of supervisory power to exclude
evidence wrongfully obtained from a non-defendant.1" The Court stat-
140. Supervisory power is a judicially created- rule permitting the court to exclude
evidence or dismiss a case in the name of judicial integrity. Crystle, supra note 15,
at 405. The Court first exercised the power in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332, 341 (19,13), by holding that incriminating statements obtained during a prolonged
detention were inadmissible, due to "considerations of justice not limited to strict
canons of evidentlary relevance."
141. United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983). Generally, courts invoke
their supervisory powers to dismiss indictments that have been reached as a result of
prosecutorial misconduct. See, e.g., United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877 (9th Cir.
1979) (holding that the cumulative effect of errors and prosecutorial misconduct pro-
duced a biased grand jury).
142. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 345 (asserting that courts should not become "accomplices
in willful disobedience of law").
143. Hastings, 461 U.S. at 505. The Court stated that the purposes underlying super
visory powers are . . . "to implement a remedy for violation of recognized rights; to
preserve judicial integrity by ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate consider-
ations validly before the jury;, and finally, as a remedy designed to deter illegal con-
duct." Id.
144. See United States v. Russel, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973) (admonishing the lower
courts from exercising their supervisory powers as a "chancellor's foot" veto over
disfavored law enforcement practices).
145. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
146. Id, at 738-42. The Court reasoned that to allow otherwise would circumvent
the established rule of excluding evidence only when an unlawful search or seizure
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ed that federal courts could exercise such supervisory powers only
when the defendant's own rights are violated, and thus severely limited
the effective use of the power.47 In light of this limitation, the courts'
supervisory powers offer little hope to defendants in need of a last-
ditch defense against the Ker-Prisbie doctrine."e
Despite the Supreme Court's curtailments on the use of supervisory
powers, some courts still state in dicta that they will employ their pow-
er in situations where the government's misconduct is pervasive or
shocking.'" Nonetheless, what these opinions reveal is that the reme-
dy offered by the court is not based on supervisory power, but is gar-
nered from fundamental due process, as recognized in Toscanino."
violates the defendant's constitutional rights. Id, at 733. Thus, the Court sought to
prevent an "end run" around settled Fourth Amendment law. See United States v.
Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1536 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
147. Gentin, supra note 15, at 1250-51; accord Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 148
(1985) ("Even a sensible and efficient use of the supervisory power ... is invalid if
it conflicts with constitutional or statutory provisions."). Justice Marshall commented
that limiting supervisory powers to a constitutional framework goes against the very
reason for creating a supervisory power.
The Court's decision to engraft the standing limitations of the Fourth
Amendment onto the exercise of supervisory powers is puzzling not only
because it runs contrary to the major purpose behind the exercise of the
supervisory powers-to protect the integrity of the court-but also because it
appears to render the supervisory powers superfluous ....
Payner, 447 U.S. at 748-49 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
148. For commentary on Supreme Court cases curtailing supervisory power, see
Gentin, supra note 15, at 1246-52.
149. In Caro-Quintero, Judge Rafeedie adopted this approach and attempted to
breath new life into the supervisory power doctrine by arguing:
[W]e can reach a time when in the interest of establishing and maintaining
civilized standards of procedure and evidence, we may wish to bar jurisdic-
tion in an abduction case as a matter not of constitutional law but in the
exercise of our supervisory power .... To my mind the Government in its
laudable interest of stopping the international drug traffic is by these repeat-
ed abductions inviting exercise of that supervisory power ....
United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 615 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (quoting United
States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir.) (Oakes, J., concurring), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
847 (1975)), fd sub nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir.
1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992); see also United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp
1506, 1536-37 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
In dicta, the Noriega court stated that if "confronted with a pure law enforcement
effort in which government agents deliberately killed and tortured individuals for the
sole purpose of... secur[ing defendant's) arrest, the Court would face a situation
which properly calls for invocation of its supervisory powers." Id. at 1536.
150. See Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1536. The district court stated that the Court in
Payner did not render the supervisory power doctrine meaningless because the gov-
ernment conduct at issue did not rise to the "pervasive or shocking misconduct stan-
'dard." Id. The court thus applied Toscanino's due process language in its determina-
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Thus, viewed from this perspective, absent a treaty violation, a
defendant's only chance to void a court's jurisdiction is through appeals
to due process."' As explained previously, a due process objection is
unlikely to succeed given the courts' extreme reluctance to even apply
due process in abduction cases.'"
E. Remedies
1. Repatriation
If a defendant successfully demonstrates that his abduction violates a
treaty, and if the offended nation files an adequate protest, the court
may remedy the treaty violation by ordering the defendant's repatria-
tion." Under such circumstances, the United States would be ordered
to offer the kidnapped individual to the offended government.'" In the
event that the offended nation refuses to accept repatriation, however,
the court may view this as a withdrawal of protest and thereby rein-
state any previously dismissed indictment.15
tion of when the court properly invokes its supervisory powers.
151. For discussion on the Toscanino due process exception, see supra notes 55-68
and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1360 (9th Cir.
1991), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992). The objective underlying the remedy of repatri-
ation is to restore the offended nation to the position it would have occupied if the
United States had complied with the treaty. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note at 109,
§ 901, R.N. 3 ("[The] reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the conse-
quences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability,
have existed if that act had not been comnutted.") (quoting Chorzow Factory (Indem-
nity) case (Ger. v. Pol.), 1936 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.17, at 47).
154. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1360; see also United States v. Rauscher, 119
U.S. 407, 430 (1886) (holding that when a receiving state seeks to prosecute an indi-
vidual for crimes other than those stated in the request for extradition, the receiving
state must first afford the individual an opportunity to return to the asylum nation);
United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 278 (2d Cir. 1974) (stating that when one
state abducts an individual from another state, such conduct violates the second
state's territorial sovereignty and is remedied by returning the kidnapped person).
155. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1362. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that such a
remedy is proper because the offended nation, not the defendant, actually seeks the
remedy. Thus, "[a] country that lodges a protest which affords a defendant stand-
ing ... must be willing to accept the necessary consequences of that action. The
nation that has unlawfully obtained jurisdiction over an individual cannot be expected
to turn him loose within its borders." Id.
1533
2. Alternative Remedies
As the foregoing discussion indicates, in absence of a treaty violation,
courts very rarely hold that the appropriate remedy for an abduction is
voiding jurisdiction." Both the strength of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine
and the strong preference of courts to leave claims regarding breaches
of territorial sovereignty to the executive branch, indicate that the rem-
edy for unlawful abduction lies within the purview of the State Depart-
ment rather than that of the courts."
67
The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States sets forth that "[i]f a state's law enforcement officials exercise
their functions in the territory of another state without the latter's con-
sent, that state is entitled to protest and, in appropriate cases, to re-
ceive reparation from the offending state."" Reparations may take the
form of monetary damages paid to the offended state." However, the
remedy most often applied-and least costly and embarrassing to the
offending nation-is the use of diplomatic channels, which include the
exchange of letters between departments of state, and occasionally a
formal apology from the offending government." Additionally, the of-
fended nation may demand further remedies, such as extradition of the
156. See supra notes 41-68, 127-52 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 41-68, 133-39 and accompanying text.
158. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note at 109, § 432 cmt c; see also id. at § 901
cmt. d ("Principles of international law concerning remedies are not rigid or formalis-
tic and give an international tribunal wide latitude to develop and shape remedies,
but the tribunal is usually restricted to measures proposed by the parties.").
159. See id. at § 901 cmt. d (1987) ("[I]n some instances compensation may be
required even though no monetary damage had occurred."); id. at § 901 cmt. e
("When an intergovernmental claim derives from an injury to a private person, the
compensation to the state need not be measured by or limited to the loss suffered
by the individual, although that loss usually provides a basis for calculating the com-
pensation due to the state."). A neutral third party, such as the United Nations, could
determine the amount of the settlement. Pontoni, supra note 31, at 240.
160. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 109, at § 901 cmt. d ("Acknowledgment
of a violation and an apology are common forms of redress, sometimes supplemented
by compensation.").
Following Israel's abduction of Nazi war criminal Adolph Eichmann from Argenti-
na, the Israeli government, though refusing to relinquish custody of Eichmann re-
sponded to Argentina's protests with a conditional apology stating that if they broke
any laws they expressed their regrets. Pontoni, supra note 31, at 240. Following the
Supreme Court's ruling in Alvarez-Machain, Mexico threatened to sever all coopera-
tion with the United States concerning drug investigations. LaFraniere, supra note 4,
at A2. In response, the State Department offered something short of an apology, stat-
ing that despite the Supreme Court ruling, the United States respects the sovereignty
of foreign governments and would carefully weigh foreign policy considerations before
engaging in future abductions. Id.
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state agents and other persons involved in the abduction. 8'
For the abducted fugitive, there is the potential remedy of a civil suit
against the individual abductors," and possibly even a civil remedy
against the abducting nation's federal officials for false imprisonment,
false arrest, assault or battery. 3
Ill. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
1. The Camerena Murder and Indictment of Dr. Machan
On February 7, 1985, DEA agent Enrique Camerena Salazar was kid-
napped outside the American consulate in Guadaljara, Jalisco, Mexi-
co.'6" One month later, agent Camerena's mutilated body and the body
of a Mexican pilot who assisted in a drug investigation were found
about sixty miles outside of Guadalajara. 63 After an extensive DEA in-
vestigation, a federal grand jury convened in Los Angeles to indict those
believed to have been involved in the murder. ' The indictment
charged nineteen persons, including Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a
Mexican national who was believed to have assisted in Camerena's tor-
ture." United States prosecutors believed that gaining custody of Dr.
Machain would be difficult, since Mexico traditionally refuses to extra-
161. See, e.g., United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 604 (C.D. CaL
1990), qffd ub nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991),
rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992). In Alvarez-Machain, Mexico formally sought the extradi-
tion of Dr. Machatn's abductors. Id. Similarly, in 1905 the Mexican government sought
the extradition of individuals charged with the abduction of Martinez, a Mexican na-
tional. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2194 n.ll. The U.S. State Department granted
the extradition request in the Martinez case, but did not allow extradition in Dr.
Macham's case. See id; see also The Alvarez-Machain Decision, 3 U.S. DEP'T ST. DiS-
PATCH 614(3) (1992) (official statement of the State Department before the House
Judiciary committee, August 3, 1992) (recognizing that trans-border abductions by
"bounty hunters" and other private individuals are extraditable offenses).
162. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886) (concluding that the individual
would probably have a cause of action for trespass and false imprisonment).
163. See Extraterritorial Apprehension by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 4B
Op. Off. Legal Counsel 543, 554-55 (1980).
164. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 601-02.
165. Id.
166. Lieberman, supra note 13, at Al.
167. Id.
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dite its own citizens, and insists on bringing criminal proceedings in
Mexico."
2. Failed Negotiations with the MFJP
The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) first attempted to secure Dr.
Machain's custody through informal negotiations with Mexican offi-
cials." The commandante of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police
(MFJP) agreed to hand over Dr. Machain in exchange for Isaac Mereno,
a Mexican national residing in the United States and wanted by Mexi-
can authorities for embezzlement.70 However, prior to the exchange,
the MFJP demanded $50,000 in advance to cover the costs of transport-
ing Dr. Machain to the United States.'' The DEA refused to make the
payment.1
72
3. The Abduction
Previous to and during negotiations, the DEA instructed its infor-
mant, Antonio Garate, a former member of the MFJP, to relate to his
contacts in Guadalajara that the DEA would pay for information leading
to apprehension and seizure of Dr. Machain."3 Shortly after negotia-
tions failed, Garate told the DEA that his "associates" believed that they
could successfully apprehend Dr. Machain and deliver him to the Unit-
ed States. 4 The DEA in Washington, D.C., approved the plan and the
final terms of the abduction."
On April 2, 1990, Dr. Machain was kidnapped from his office in
Guadalajara and flown to awaiting DEA agents in El Paso, Texas."
168. Id. Under the current extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico,
the Mexican government has the right to refuse extradition of its own nationals, pro-
vided that it initiate criminal proceedings in Mexico. See Extradition Treaty, May 4,
1978, U.S.-Mex., art. 9, 31 U.S.T. 5059, 5065.
169. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 602 (C.D. Cal 1990), oWf'd sub
nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S.
Ct. 2188 (1992).
170. Id. The Mexican officials proposed that this plan be performed "under the
table" because its disclosure would "upset" Mexican citizens. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 603.
174. Id. According to Garate, his "associates" included former and current military
police officers, and various civilians. Ld.
175. Id.
176. Id. Upon arrival, government agents asked Dr. Machain "whether he had been
tortured, mistreated or abused" by his kidnappers. Id. at 604. He stated that none of
those incidents occurred. Id. Further a physician who examined Dr. Machain after his
arrival in El Paso found no sign of mistreatment or abuse. Id.
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The DEA testified that none of its agents participated in the actual
abduction, and that when they received Dr. Machan one of the abduc-
tors claimed that they were members of the Mexican police." One
month later, the DEA made a partial reward payment of $20,000 to the
Mexican abductors, and in several cases, the DEA evacuated the abduc-
tors and their families from Mexico to the United States.1"
4. The Mexican Response
On April 18, 1990, the Mexican Embassy sent a diplomatic note to the
State Department requesting a detailed report on possible United States
involvement in Dr. Machain's abduction.' One month later, the Mexi-
can Embassy sent a second diplomatic note stating that it believed Dr.
Machan's abduction was "carried out with knowledge of persons work-
ing for the United States government, in violation of the extradition
treaty in force between the two countries." " The note also demanded
Dr.Machain's return. 8 '
5. Dr. Machain's Defense
Dr. Machan faced several charges: conspiring to kidnap a federal
agent, committing violent acts in furtherance of racketeering activity,
and felony murder." Dr. Machain filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction based on four theories: first, his abduction violated
his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment; second, the
methods used to obtain his presence violated the U.S.-Mexico extradi-
tion treaty;"M third, the means of apprehension violated the Charters
of the United Nations and the Organization of American States; and
177. Id. at 603.
178. Id
179. Id. at 604.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 601 n.1.
183. Id. at 604. For commentary on the weakness of this constitutional claim in
federal courts, see discussion of the Ker-frisbie doctrine, supra notes 41-68 and
accompanying text.
184. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 606. The treaty violation exception to the Ker-
Prisbie doctrine is discussed supra notes 69-126 and accompanying text.
185. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 614. For a discussion of the effect of human
rights and international law violations on a court's jurisdiction, see supra notes 127-
39 and accompanying text.
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finally, the government's misconduct called for an exercise of the
court's supervisory power."
B. Opinions of the Lower Courts
Judge Rafeedie granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding
that the government sponsored abduction violated the extradition treaty
between the United States and Mexico.1" The court reasoned that the
Ker-Frisbie doctrine, which holds that abductions do not void a court's
jurisdiction,1" is inapplicable when the abduction violates an extradi-
tion treaty and the offended nation adequately protests the viola-
tion."8 The court relied heavily on its interpretation of United States
v. Rausche 91 to determine that the extradition treaty impliedly prohib-
ited unilateral abductions."1 Regarding Dr. Machan's due process
claim, the court found the allegations of mistreatment, even if true,
were not so egregious to warrant dismissal."g In addressing the
defendant's claims under the UN and OAS conventions, the court recog-
nized that those international instruments are not self-executing, and
therefore, without implementing legislation, they are not enforceable in
federal courts." The court also rejected Dr. Machain's appeal to the
court's supervisory power, asserting the irrelevance of the issue in light
of the other basis for dismissal1 " The court intimated, however, that
repeated abductions by the DEA may invite the court's supervisory
power in the future."
186. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 615. The court's supervisory power is discussed
supra notes 140-52 and accompanying text.
187. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 615. The court imputed the United States gov-
ernment with responsibility for the abduction because the government paid the abduc-
tors to effect the kidnapping. Id. at 609. The court found no official participation by
the Mexican government because, although some current and former Mexican officials
participated in the abduction, they were not officially acting under government au-
thority. Id. at 612. For a discussion of the need for state action in finding violations
of an extradition treaty, see supra note 73 and accompanying text.
188. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 611; see also Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 442-
43 (1886). For a further discussion of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, see supra note 50
and accompanying text.
189. Ker, 119 U.S. at 603-08.
190. 119 U.S. 407 (1886). For a further discussion of Rauscher, see supra notes 86-
94 and accompanying text.
191. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 610. For a more complete discussion of Judge
Rafeedie's "permissive" interpretation of Rauscher, see supra notes 96-97 and accom-
panying text.
192. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 605-06.
193. Id. at 614.
194. Id. at 615.
195. Id. (quoting United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir.) (Oakes, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975)).
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed," and the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari.197
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION
A. The Majority Opinion: Abductions Do Not Violate Due Process or
Extradition Treaties-Ker-Prisbie Revisited
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court," identified the main
issue as whether Dr. Machain's abduction violated the extradition treaty
between the United States and Mexico, thereby warranting the lower
court's dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction.1"
1. Application of the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine-The Legality of
Abductions
Citing both Ker v. Illinois, and Frisbie v. Collins," the Court
started with the basic premise that abductions alone do not divest a
court of jurisdiction.' The Court reasoned that due process is sat-
isfied when the defendant receives a lawful indictment and a fair tri-
al.' Further, "[t]here is nothing in the Constitution that requires a
court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice be-
cause he was brought to trial against his will."'
2. The Treaty Violation Exception-Neither the Express Terms Nor
Any Implied Terms Prohibit Official Abductions
In contrast to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, the Court acknowledged that
196: United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S:
Ct 2188 (1992).
197. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 857 (1992).
198. Justices White, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter and Thomas joined in the majority
opinion. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2190 (1992). Justice
Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Blackmun and O'Connor joined.
Id, at 2197.
199. Id. at 2191.
200. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
201. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
202. Alvan,2-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2192. For further discussion of the Ker-frisbie
doctrine, see supra notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
203. Id. at 2192 (citing both Ker, 119 U.S. at 444, and FPisbie, 342 U.S. at 522).
204. Id. (quoting Prisbie, 342 U.S. at 522).
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the rule of Ker does not apply when an abduction violates the terms of
a binding extradition treaty.' Finding no express provision in the
U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty which prohibits abductions,' the Court
addressed Dr. Machain's contention that his abduction violated an im-
plied term of the treaty.' The Court noted that United States v.
Rauschet ° addressed the same issue.2" In Rauscher, the court
found that the terms and history of the U.S.-Britain extradition treaty
gave rise to an implied term of "specialty," prohibiting indictments for
charges other than those specified in an extradition request.2 0 Thus,
within the framework provided by Rauscher, the Court examined
whether the terms and history of the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty
impliedly prohibited abductions as a method for obtaining jurisdic-
tion.2"
Dr. Machain argued that Articles 22(1) and 9 of the Treaty show that
the signatory nations intended the agreement to be the exclusive means
of rendition.2"2 He reasoned that Article 22(1), which applies to offens-
es specified in Article Two, evidences the parties' intent to surrender
custody only for those specified offenses.213 Dr. Machain further ar-
205. Id. at 2193. The Court distinguished Ker from Rauscher by emphasizing that in
Ker the United States did not invoke the extradition mechanism, whereas in Rauscher
the United States used the extradition treaty to gain custody of the defendant. See
id at 2191-92. The Court relied on this distinction to support its proposition that the
formal use of the extradition treaty mechanism is a necessary element of the treaty
violation exception to the Ker-frisbie. See id at 2193.
206. Id. at 2193. The court first examined the tieaty on its face and found no pro-
vision expressly prohibiting either country's use of abductions to gain custody over
defendants. Id. ("In construing a treaty, as in construing a statute, we first look to
its terms to determine its meaning." (citing Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397
(1985)). Had the Court found an express violation, it would have analyzed the case
under Cook v. United States 288 U.S. 102 (1933), and held that the treaty prohibited
the government from seizing Dr. Machain without Mexico's consent. See Cook, 288
U.S. at 120-22. For further discussion on violations of express treaty provisions, see
supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
207. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2194-96.
208. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
209. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct at 2193.
210. Id. For further discussion of Rauscher, see supra note 86-94 and accompanying
text The Court pointed out that Rauscher is not completely analogous to the present
case because the defendant in Rauscher was brought to the United States through
extradition process, not by abduction. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct at 2192-93. This
distinction became the springboard for the Court's conclusion that Dr. Machain's ab-
duction did not violate the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty. See infra notes 212-21 and
accompanying text
211. Id. at 2193.
212. Id
213. Id. Appendix 31 of the Treaty sets forth crimes that will subject individuals to
extradition. See Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., Appendix, 31 U.S.T. 5059,
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gued that Article 9, which allows either party to refuse extradition of its
own nationals, shows that the parties intended to preserve their sover-
eign right to prosecute their own citizens in their own courts.1 4 Dr.
Machain argued that these provisions would be utterly frustrated if one
nation could abduct foreign nationals without the asylum state's con-
sent.
21 5
The Court rejected these arguments by concluding that Articles 22(1)
and 9 did not limit either country's freedom to use alternative methods
of rendition.2 6 The Court based its conclusion on two crucial premis-
es. First, the function of extradition treaties is not to limit the respec-
tive law enforcement agencies to a single method of gaining custody;
rather, extradition treaties are' merely cooperative mechanisms, which if
used impose an obligation on the requested state to extradite certain
individuals, subject to any express exceptions.1 7 Second, an examina-
tion of the history of negotiations and state practice under the U.S.-
Mexico treaty shows that the signatories did not intend to limit each
other's ability to use abductions.2 ' The Court noted that as early as
1905, Mexico was aware of the Ker doctrine and the longstanding prac-
tice of the U.S. courts to extend jurisdiction over defendants despite
their illegal abductions. 219 Nonetheless, the Court noted that the cur-
5076-78.
214. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193-94. Article 9 of the Treaty provides:
1. Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to deliver up its own nationals,
but the executive authority of the requested Party shall, if not prevented by
the laws of that Party, have the power to deliver them up if, in its discre-
tion, it be deemed proper to do so.
2. If extradition is not granted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the
requested Party shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the
purpose of prosecution, provided that Party has jurisdiction over the offense.
Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., art. 9, 31 U.S.T 5059, 5065.
215. Id. at 2194. The Ninth Circuit also adopted this argument in United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1350 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 2986
(1992). The appellate court in Verdugo-Uriquidez additionally found that both Article
5, which prohibits extradition for political offenses, and Article 8, which prohibits
extradition for military offenses, would be rendered meaningless if either party was
allowed to resort to kidnapping. Id,
216. Alva'rez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193.
217. Id, at 2194 (citing 1 J. MOORE, A TREATISE ON EFxTRADmoN AND INTERSTATE
RENDMON § 72 (1891)). For a commentary on diverging views concerning the object
and purpose of extradition treaties, see supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
218. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2194.
219. Id. The Court essentially contended that the Mexican government had "notice"
of the United States position that abductions were outside the scope of the extradi-
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rent version of the Treaty does not contain any provision that curtails
the effect of Ker.2 Moreover, the Court added, Mexican and Ameri-
can treaty drafters specifically rejected proposals made by international
law scholars in 1935, which sought to generally prohibit abductions in
all extradition treaties.22
3. The Non-Effect of Customary International Law
Having concluded that abductions do not violate any express or im-
plied treaty terms, the Court next considered whether international
norms prohibiting abductions could be read into the Treaty. Citing
Rauscher, Dr. Machain contended that because abductions so clearly
violate international law, the drafters had no reason to expressly pro-
hibit them.2' This proposition, however, assumes that treaties are in-
terpreted against a backdrop of customary international law-an as-
sumption the Court was unwilling to make.2 The Court argued that a
tion treaty. See id Evidence of this notice appears in the diplomatic exchange be-
tween Mexico and the United States which followed the 1905 abduction of Martinez,
a Mexican national. Id. at 2194 n.11. In that exchange, the Mexican government
wrote to the U.S. Secretary of State, protesting that Martinez' arrest was an illegal
action because the method of arrest was outside the procedures established in the
extradition treaty. Id, at 2194. The Secretary of State responded that the Court's deci-
sion in Ker controlled, and therefore, U.S. courts had valid jurisdiction over Martinez.
Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 2194-95; see Malvina Halberstam, Agora.. International Kidnapping: In
Defense of The Supreme Court Decision in Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L L 736
(1992). In 1935, the Advisory Committee of Research in International Law proposed:
In exercising jurisdiction... no State shall prosecute or punish any person
who has been brought within its territory or a place subject to its authority
by recourse to measures in violation of international law or international
convention without first obtaining the consent of the State ... whose rights
have been violated by such measures.
Id. at 738 n.15.
222. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2195 (1992).
223. Id. The relevant international law principle in this case is the concept of terri-
torial sovereignty which states that one government may not exercise its police pow-
er in the territory of another state. See RESTATEmENT (THIRD), supra note 109, at
§ 432(2) cmt. b ("It is universally recognized, as a corollary of state sovereignty, that
officials of one state may not exercise their functions in the territory of another state
without the latter's consent."). For further commentary on territorial sovereignty as
embodied in the U.N. and O.A.S. charters, see supra note 130.
224. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2195 (1992). The Court ar-
gued that to imply the principle of territorial sovereignty into the Treaty would be to
expand the Treaty's scope beyond Its logical boundaries. See id, at 2196. The Court
noted that many actions "would violate this principle, including waging war, but it
cannot seriously be contended that an invasion of the United States by Mexico would
violate the terms of the extradition treaty between the two nations." Id
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more appropriate backdrop, and one that is in line with the parties'
expectations, is the history of enforcement between the treaty partners
and the general practices of states regarding extradition treaties.'
Therefore, the Court maintained that although abductions violate princi-
ples of international law, that does not necessarily translate into a viola-
tion of any particular treaty.' In the Court's view, to hold otherwise
would imply terms of general international law, which, as evidenced by
the agreement's actual language, the parties neither intended nor ex-
pected.'
The Court criticized Dr. Machain's use of Rauscher for the proposi-
tion that a court may imply a backdrop of international law into an
existing extradition treaty.' The Court explained, "In Rauscher, we
implied a term in the Webster-Ashburton Treaty because of the practice
of nations with regard to extradition treaties. In the instant case, [Dr.
Machain] would imply terms in the extradition treaty from the practice
of nations with regards to international law more generally." Thus,
the Court concluded that Rauscher does not support a far reaching
inquiry into generalities of international law.'s
225. Id. at 2195-96. The backdrop that the Court proposed, the history of enforce-
ment between the treaty parties and state practice regarding extradition treaties is
analogous to the backdrop for contracts in general commercial law. Under the Uni-
form Conercial Code, the courts may interpret ambiguous contract terms by course
of dealing between contracting parties and general trade usage. See U.C.C. §2-202
(1990) (providing that ambiguous contract terms may be "explained or supplemented"
by course of dealing or usage of trade).
226. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2195-96.
227. Id at 2196. The Court relied on prior decisions holding that violations of in-
ternational law alone do not affect a court's jurisdiction. See id. at 2196 n. 15. (citing
Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933)); The Merino, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 391
(1824); Richmond, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 102 (1815). For historical discussion of these
cases, see supra note 133-39 and accompanying text.
228. Id. at 2195-96.
229. Id. at 2195-96. In Rauscher, the Court addressed whether the doctrine of spe-
cialty, which prohibits the prosecution of an extradited defendant for crimes other
than those the subject of extradition, was an implied term in the U.S.-Britain extradi-
tion treaty. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 411 (1886). After examining the
terms and history of the treaty, the practice of other nations in enforcing their trea-
ties and noting the existence of two federal statutes imposing the doctrine of spe-
cialty upon U.S. extradition treaties, the Rauscher Court concluded that the doctrine
was impliedly part of the Treaty even though no provision explicitly so provided. Id,
at 430.
230. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2196. The Court intimated that the difference
between Rauscher and Alvarez-Machain was merely one of degree. See id.
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4. Conclusion
In summary, the Court held that general international law principles
have no bearing on the interpretation of extradition treaties." The
Court stressed that the appropriate backdrop is the history of en-
forcement between the treaty partners and the state's practices in rela-
tion to' extradition treaties generally.' More significantly, in applying
that backdrop to the present case, the Court found no indication that
the parties intended to prohibit unilateral abductions.m Therefore,
having found that Dr. Machan's abduction did not violate the terms of
the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty, the Court concluded that the Ker
rule applied and the lower court erred in voiding its jurisdiction.'
B. The Dissent-Government Abductions Violate the Object and
Purpose of Extradition Treaties
1. The Distinction Between Government and Private
Abductions-The Inapplicability of the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent,' criticized the majority's
application of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine to the present case.' Justice
Stevens emphasized that Ker involved the abduction of a United States
citizen by private individuals rather than by paid agents of the govern-
ment.' Also, unlike the present case, Frisbie involved an abduction
In Rauscher, the Implication of a doctrine of specialty into the terms of the
U.S.-British treaty which, by its terms, required the presentation of evidence
establishing probable cause of the [crime] before extradition was required,
was a small step to take. By contrast, to imply from the terms of this Treaty
that it prohibits obtaining the presence of an individual by means outside of
the procedures the Treaty establishes requires a much larger inferential leap,
with only the most general of international law principles to support it.
Id,
231. See id. at 2195-96. The Court finally noted that objections to violations of in-
temational law, which concern issues outside the scope of the treaty, are matters for
the executive branch. See id, Although not specifically stated, the Court's deference
to the executive branch invokes the separation of powers principle, traditionally re-
lied on by courts facing difficult questions of treaty interpretation. For further dis-
cussion on this point, see supra notes 125-26, 137-39 and accompanying text.
232. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2196.
233. See id. at 2193-96.
234. Id. at 2197.
235. Justices Blackmun and O'Connor joined in the dissenting opinion. Id.
236. Id. at 2197 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a full discussion of the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine, see supra notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
237. United States v. Avarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2197 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 438 (1886).
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which occurred within the United States.m Therefore, Justice Stevens
believed that neither case spoke to the precise issue before the Court:
the legality of "[one government's] abduction of another country's citi-
zen."2s However, Stevens noted that the Court addressed very similar
issues in United States v. Rauschem and Cook v. United States, 1
where, after finding government responsibility for the alleged illegal
acts, the Court refused to apply the Ker rule.' Therefore, Justice
Stevens argued that the Court should have similarly rejected the Ker
doctrine due to official U.S. involvement in the present case.'
Despite this initial criticism, Justice Stevens agreed with the majority
that the Court must ultimately decide whether the provisions of the
U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty prohibit abductions.' Unlike the ma-
jority, Justice Stevens interprets the treaty far differently by conducting
"a fair reading" of the treaty in light of Rauscher and "applicable princi-
ples of international law."'
2. Unilateral Abductions Contradict the Treaty's Object and Purpose
'Under recognized rules of treaty interpretation, Justice Stevens deter-
mined that the Court must "give the specific words of the treaty a
meaning consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting par-
ties." Justice Stevens defined American and Mexican expectations
by examining the purposes of the Treaty as stated in its preamble: "to
cooperate more closely in the fight against crime and to this end, to
238. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2197 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Frisbie v.
Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 520 (1952).
239. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2197 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
240. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
241. 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
242. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2203 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Cook, United
States customs agents seized the defendant's vessel 11 miles off American shores.
Cook, 288 U.S. at 104. In Rauscher, United States and British authorities were in-
volved in extraditing the defendant Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 409. In contrast, the agent
in Ker who made the arrest acted independently, not under the authority of any
government. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 438 (1886). Thus, "[t]he invasion of the sov-
ereignty of Peru . . . was by individuals perhaps some of them owing no allegiance
to the United States, and not by the Federal government." Id. at 634.
243. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct at 2197 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
244. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
245. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 2198 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S.
392, 399 (1985)).
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mutually render better assistance in matters of extradition." 7 Justice
Stevens argued that an interpretation that encourages abductions is
inherently inconsistent with the stated purposes of cooperation and
mutual assistance.' He claimed that the majority's interpretation is
also inconsistent with the historical purpose of treaties in general.'
Justice Stevens argued that nations created these agreements to reduce
potential international conflict caused by various countries' law enforce-
ment agencies.' Therefore, the treaty mechanism is meant not only
as a cooperative tool for law enforcement agencies, but also as 'a
safeguard against territorial invasions of one country caused by law
enforcement activities of another." In light of this purpose, Justice
Stevens concluded that courts cannot interpret extradition treaties as
permitting unilateral abductions.'
3. Interpreting the Treaty as the Exclusive Means of Rendition
Justice Stevens went on to criticize the majority for failing to recog-
nize that the particular construction of the U.S.-Mexico treaty evidences
a clear intent that the treaty is the exclusive, means of rendition.'
First, Stevens noted that the treaty is a comprehensive instrument and
"appears to cover the entire subject of extradition."' Of particular
importance are the provisions listing extraditable offenses,' and
those provisions that preserve the asylum country's right to refuse de-
livery of its own nationals' or those charged with political offens-
es. 7 Justice Stevens argued that the effect of these provisions would
247. Id. at 2198 (citations and footnotes omitted) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 2198 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
249. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
250. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 1 M. CHERIF BASSiouNm, INTERNATIONAL Ex-
TRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 6 (1974)).
251. Id. at 2198 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Several international scholars support Jus-
tice Stevens' enlightened view of extradition treaties. See e.g., Lowenfeld I, supra
note 15, at 655-61; Abramovsky, supra note 13, at 173-74; BASSIOUNI, supra note 102,
at 6. Judge Rafeedie also adopted this view. See United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745
F. Supp. 599, 609 (C.D. Cal. 1990), affd sub nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
946 F.2d 1499 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992). For commentary which
criticizes this view of extradition treaties, see Matorin, supra note 98, at 913.
252. See United States v. Alvarez-Machan, 112 S. Ct 2188, 2198 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
253. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 2198 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
255. Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., art. 2, 31 U.S.T. 5059, 5062. Article
2 specifies: 'Extradition shall take place, subject to this Treaty, for wilful acts which
fall within any of the clauses of the Appendix ... ." Id.
256. Id. at 5065. For the complete text of this provision, see supra note 168.
257. Id. at 5063. Article 5 states that "Extradition shall not be granted when the of-
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be utterly frustrated if alternative means of rendition were permit-
ted.' Therefore, the dissent concluded that the only rational interpre-
tation that gives effect to the treaty provisions is that unilateral abduc-
tions are prohibited.'
Justice Stevens also disagreed with majority's analysis that the treaty
partners' historical practice demonstrates that abductions are a valid
alternative to extradition." The dissent argued that according to the
Mexican government's amicus curiae brief, Mexico believes that the
Treaty is the exclusive means of rendition. 1 Justice Stevens also not-
ed that the Canadian government's view that the U.S.-Canada treaty has
exclusivity lends further support to an assumption of exclusivity in the
present case.' Therefore, he argued that the burden should fall on
the United States government to prove that the treaty's is not the exclu-
sive means of rendition.' Because "[tihe United States has offered no
evidence from the negotiating record, ratification process, or later com-
munications with Mexico" to overcome their burden, the assumption of
fense for which it is requested is political or of a political character." Id.; see also
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2198 (1992) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
258. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct at 2198 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens criticized
the majority approach as too textualistic and narrow. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Moreover, he complained that the Court's conclusion that "the Treaty merely creates
an optional method [of rendition], and that the parties silently reserved the right to
resort to sell help," ultimately leads to absurd results. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Thus, Justice StevensL argued that under the majority's interpretation, torture or assas-
sination are also alternative remedies to extradition which are permissible under the
treaty. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 2198-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a similar analysis, see United States
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1349 (1991), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (con-
cluding that; the treaty provisions only make sense if each nation must comply with
those procedures).
260. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2199-200 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 2200 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Following the Court's decision, Mexican of-
ficials publicly condemned the ruling and expressed their belief that the treaty was
the only legitimate and legally recognized means of obtaining custody. Marjorie Miller,
Mexico Attacks Ruling; Halts Drug War Role, LA. TIMEs, June 16, 1992, at A6. These
statements are misleading because Mexico and the United States often recognize al-
terative means of rendition. See infra notes 325-37 and accompanying text.
262. Id. at 2200 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Following the Court's decision, the
Canadian government issued an official statement that proclaimed that "[a]ny attempt
by a foreign official to abduct someone from Canadian territory is a criminal act"
LaFraniere, supra note 4, at A2.
263. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2199 n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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exclusivity should control.2
Justice Stevens found further support in United States v.
Rauscher.' In Rauscher, the Court, held that the purpose of an ex-
tradition treaty between the United States and Great Britain could only
be served by implying the doctrine of specialty.' Justice Stevens ar-
gued that the holding in Rauscher permits courts to imply terms into a
treaty which are consistent with the purpose of that instrument.",
Therefore, the dissent believed that in light of the extradition treaty's
purpose of avoiding infringements of territorial sovereignty by law en-
forcement agents, the Court should have implied a term prohibiting ab-
ductions.m
4. The Effect of International Law
Justice Stevens attacked the majority's opinion as inconsistent with
"the consensus of international opinion that condemns one Nation's
violation of the territorial sovereignty of a friendly neighbor."2
Stevens cited numerous provisions of the U.N. and O.A.S. charters
which define the principle of territorial sovereignty as a fundamental
right of nations.' He then noted the opinions of international legal
scholars who condemn abductions as a clear breach of that right. 1
264. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
265. See id. at 2200 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S.
407 (1886).
266. See Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 429. For a detailed treatment of Rauscher, see supra
notes 86-94 and accompanying text
267. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2200 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 2201 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority seemed to agree with
Stevens' opinion that Rauscher permits courts to imply terms into a treaty that are
consistent with the treaty's object and purpose. See id. at 2194-95. However, the ma-
jority disagreed with Stevens regarding the object and purpose of an extradition trea-
ty. The majority took a narrower view in holding that the sole object of an extradi-
tion treaty is to facilitate the transfer of criminals from one nation to another. See
id. In contrast, Justice Stevens took an expansive view by stating that the object is
to protect the treaty partners' territorial sovereignty. See id. at 2200-01 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). For further discussion of these contrasting views, see supra notes 95-108
and accompanying text.
269. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2201 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
270. Id. at 2201 n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For commentary on these international
conventions, see supra notes 127, 131.
Justice Stevens also drew upon Justice Story's opinion in The Apollon, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 362 (1824), which denounced the seizure of a foreign ship in a Spanish
port by U.S. agents by remarking that "[i]t cannot be presumed that Congress would
voluntarily justify such a clear violation of the law of nations." Alvarez-Machain, 112
S. Ct. at 2201-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quotations omitted).
271. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2201-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "It is... a
breach of International Law for a State to send its agents to the territory of another
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Therefore, Stevens concluded that given the overwhelming consensus
within the international community that abductions are an improper
means of apprehending fugitives, extradition treaties, like other interna-
tional agreements, are in accord with this view. 2
5. Judicial Integrity and Support for the Rule of Law-A Call for the
Court's Supervisory Powers
Justice Stevens aimed his final assault at the majority's devastating
impact on the integrity of the Rule of Law."' Justice Stevens claimed
that by permitting the illegal actions of the government to avoid even
the slightest judicial scrutiny, the Court essentially sanctions criminal
activiiy." He furthered argued that approving such lawlessness under-
mines the Court's integrity and endangers the very foundations of the
Rule of Law it has a duty to uphold.' More importantly, the decision
invites individuals and other governments to take the law into their
own hands.
Justice Stevens conceded that the government has an "intense inter-
est" in punishing brutal crimes such as the alleged torture-murder in the
present case.2" However, he concluded that pursuing that interest in a
manner which ignores the rule of law and jeopardizes the well being of
State to apprehend persons accused of having committed a crime. Apart from other
satisfaction, the first duty of the offending State is to hand over the person in ques-
tion . . . ." Id. at 2202 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting I OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL
LAW 295 n.1 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955).
272. See id. at 2201-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that given
this consensus, it was far easier for the Court to imply a term into the treaty than it
was for the Rauscher Court because at the time the Court decided Rauscher, no
consensus on the doctrine of specialty had been reached. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
273. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
274. AL (Stevens, J., dissenting).
275. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although not stating so expressly, Justice Stevens
suggested that the Court may properly exercise its supervisory powers in the present
case. For further discussion on a court's supervisory powers, see supra notes 140-52
and accompanying text; see also infra notes 306-10 and accompanying text.
276. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2205 n.33 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Our- Govern-
ment is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole
people by its example .... If the Government becomes the lawbreaker, it breeds
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anar-
chy." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438,
485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
277. Id. at 2205 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the entire legal system is a risk not worth taking.2m
V. IMPACT
A. Legal Impact-Traditional Rules Affirned
1. Ker-Frisbie Unscathed
The Alvarez-Machain decision clearly affirmed the 107 year old Ker-
Frisbie doctrine. Extraterritorial abductions alone neither violate a
defendant's due process rights nor divest a court of its jurisdiction.'
The Court rejected assertions by Justice Stevens and the Ninth Circuit
that Ker-Fisbie does not apply to government sponsored extraterritori-
al abductions.'s According to the current Court majority, Ker-Frisbie
applies to all extraterritorial abductions, whether conducted by private
individuals or government officials." 1 Apparently, the only instance
where the doctrine does not apply is when an abduction violates the
express terms of an extradition treaty.'
2. The Treaty Violation Exception-The "Plain Meaning" Approach
to Treaty Interpretation
Alvarez-Machain made clear that for this limited exception to apply,
the abduction must either violate an express provision of an extradition
treaty,2s or contradict recognized state practices regarding extradition
treaties.' One effect of this narrow approach is that it provides the
278. Id. at 2206 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 2191-92; see also supra notes 200-04 and accompanying text. The present
Court's adoption of Ker-Frisbie reflects its general reluctance to apply constitutional
principles to government acts abroad. See Crystle, supra note 15, at 394-96; see also
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1066 (1990) (refusing to apply the
Fourth Amendment to illegal government searches abroad).
280. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2196-97; see also supra notes 200-04 and
accompanying text
281. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2191-92; see also supra notes 200-04 and
accompanying text
282. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193. For a full discussion on the treaty
violation exception to the Ker-F,-isbie doctrine, see supra notes 69-94 and accompa-
nying text
283. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193. The Court regards Cook v. United States,
288 U.S. 102 (1933), as the best example of a case in which the violation of an ex-
press treaty provision may affect a court's jurisdiction. Id. at 2192 n.16. For further
discussion on Cook, see supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text
284. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2194. The majority did not completely rule out
implying terms into an extradition treaty. See id. For example, the weight of United
States v. Rauscher, in which the Court implied the doctrine of specialty into an ex-
tradition treaty, prohibits the foreclosure of that possibility. See United States v.
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parties with considerable certainty in negotiating and drafting trea-
ties.'e More importantly, the Court wisely avoided second-guessing
the final terms of the agreement.' In the end, adherence to the
agreement's actual language allows the Court to preserve the parties'
original expectations.'
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 419 (1886); see also notes 86-94 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Rauscher). Nonetheless, the Court's strict textualistic approach to treaty inter-
pretation indicates an obvious reluctance to recognize implied terms. See Alvarez-
Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2194-95; see also supra notes 206-21 and accompanying text
(revealing the Court's textualistic approach in Alvarez-Machain).
285. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2194-97. The Court's deference to the exec-
utive branch in the areas of treaty negotiation and enforcement also finds support in
the Constitution, which expressly mandates that the executive branch negotiate trea-
ties. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also Jamaica v. United States, 770 F. Supp 627, 631
(M.D. Fla. 1991) ("[Q]uestions of treaty interpretation, clarification and implementation
are functions necessarily carried out by the executive branch."); Ex parte Lopez, 6 F.
Supp. 342, 344 (S.D. Tex. 1934) (deferring treaty violation claims to the executive
branch).
286. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193-97. The Court's limited view of extradi-
tion treaties furthers this point because it considers treaties as optional, cooperative
agreements that serve only to aid the signatory countries in law enforcement. See id.
at 2194; see also supra notes 216-21 and accompanying text. The Court reasoned that
if the governments intended the treaty to act as the parties' exclusive means of ren-
dition, they would have stated so in the agreement. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct
at 2194; see also supra notes 216-21 and accompanying text The proposition that na-
tions intend to use extradition treaties to safeguard their territorial integrity or pro-
vide substantive protections to persons subject to extradition is conspicuously missing
from the treaty's text or its preamble. See Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex.,
31 U.S.T. 5061 (treaty preamble). The absence of such language constitutes strong
evidence that nations intend a restrictive interpretation rather than an expansive one.
See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct at 2194; see supra notes 216-21 and accompanying
text.
287. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193-97. The Court's textualistic approach to
treaty interpretation finds support in the rules set forth in the Vienna Convention on
Treaties. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 31, 8
LL.M. 679.
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordi-
nary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
light of its object and purpose.
Id. (emphasis added). In its commentary to article 31, the International Law Commis-
sion indicated that the drafters adopted a "textual," or "plain meaning," approach to
treaty interpretation. HARMS, supra note 133, at 770.
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3. Standing
Ironically, on the issue of standing the majority appeared far more
"liberal" than both the dissent and the Ninth Circuit. The majority stat-
ed that formal government protests or demands for repatriation are
unnecessary to give the defendant standing to object to treaty viola-
tions.'s The majority explained that because extradition treaties are
self-executing and have the force of law, courts must enforce them on
behalf of an individual regardless of any protest by the offended na-
tion.'
The influence this point will have on future lower court cases is un-
clear. Federal courts, which require government protest to confer stand-
ing, may disregard the Court's reasoning as dicta.m However, other
circuits will likely embrace the Court's reasoning because it eliminates
time consuming and needless discussion concerning what constitutes
"adequate" government protest.21
4. Effect of International Law
The Court strenuously rejected the contention that violations of inter-
national law affect a court's jurisdiction.' As explained in the histori-
cal background section of this Note, several early Supreme Court cases
support this restrictive approach.' Under the Court's treaty interpre-
288. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2195. For further commentary on the lower courts'
standing requirement, see supra notes 109-26 and accompanying text.
289. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2195. United States v. Rauscher directly sup-
ports the Court's reasoning. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 417-18
(1886). In Rauscher, the Court found that private citizens had automatic standing to
enforce their rights in federal court because extradition treaties, as self-executing
agreements, have the force of law and may be challenged like any other federal stat-
ute. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. VI ("Treaties made ... under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land. .. ").
290. The opinions in Verdugo-Urquidez and in Caro-Quintero exempliy the Ninth
Circuit position. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1355; United States v. Caro-
Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 606-07 (C.D. Cal. 1990), af'd sub norm. United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992); United
States ex reL Luan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001
(1975). These courts reason that because treaties are essentially obligations between
nations, "claims for violation . . . may be made only by the state to whom the obli-
gation is owed." Caro Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 607 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 109, at § 902 cmt. a).
291. For further commentary on the difficulties that courts may have in determining
an adequate government protest, see supra notes 113-26 and accompanying text.
292. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2195.
293. See, e.g., The Merino, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 391 (1824) (holding that the seizure
of a vessel in violation of international law does not affect jurisdiction); The Rich-
1552
[Vol. 20: 1503, 1993] United States v. Alvarez-Machain
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
tation rules, only the explicit terms of the treaty control. 4 However,
the practice of nations with regard to extradition treaties or the history
of enforcement between the treaty partners may help to explain the
treaty terms.2 All references to other sources, even the most well
recognized authorities on general international norms, have no persua-
sive effect; on this Court's treaty analysis.9 Consequently, the only
time that international norms apply is when the parties expressly pro-
vide for them in their agreement. This restrictive approach has the
arguable advantage of providing increased certainty to the parties in
negotiating, drafting and interpreting agreements.9
5. Upholding the "Rule of Law"
According to the dissent, the Court's decision has a decidedly nega-
tive impact on the "Rule of Law." ' 9 Because the decision apparently
confirms the government's resort to kidnapping, society can arguably
expect an increased disrespect for the law, both domestically and inter-
nationally."2 More importantly, commentators argue that by denigrat-
ing the extradition process and fostering an international norm of self-
help, the decision jeopardizes the safety of American citizens."9 ' For
example, nations hostile to the United States could point to Alvarez-
Machain to justify the abduction of American nationals suspected of
mond, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 102 (1815) (same). For further commentary on this point,
see supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
294. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193-94.
295. See id, at 2194-96;. see also notes 212-21 and accompanying text.
296. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2195-96; see also notes 222-34 and accompa-
nying text.
297. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193-96.
298. See id, As mentioned earlier in this Note, because customary international law
depends on state practice, its boundaries are neither fixed nor well defined. See HAR-
RIS, supra note 133, at 1-7 (discussing customary international law as "Law," including
the problems in defining and enforcing it); see also supra notes 133-39 and accom-
panying text. Therefore, because customary law is constantly changing, its incorpora-
tion would inject unwanted uncertainty into treaty agreements with supposedly fixed
and determined terms.
299. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2205-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
supra notes 273-78 and accompanying text
300. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2205-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
301. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1362 (9th Cir. 1991),
vacated, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992); Downing, supra note 15, at 594-95; Alan Dershowitz,
International Ciility Requires Mutiny on the Bounty, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan.
20, 1992, at 36.
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crimes in their countries.' In fact, Iran, has claimed a right to seize
people in the United States for crimes against the state of Iran.'
. In defense of the majority's position, it may be argued that Alvarez-
Machain upheld the "Rule of Law." As the historical analysis section of
this Note indicates, Alvarez-Machain is in complete accord with the
Court's well-settled principles and the United States Constitution.'
Moreover, in response to the special hazards raised by the Court's deci-
sion, it should be noted that the Court is bound "to render judgment
evenly and dispassionately according to [the] law." ' Therefore, the
risk of an unpopular opinion or social backlash should not affect the
Court's decisions.
6. The Use of Supervisory Powers
As the historical background section reveals, in recent years the
Court has undermined the utility of the supervisory powers doctrine as
an alternative to the Toscanino due process exception." However, in
his dissent, Justice Stevens attempted to breath new life into superviso-
ry powers, suggesting that the Court should have exercised such power
in the present case and dismissed Dr. Machain's indictment.37 Judge
Rafeedie in the lower court opinion similarly discussed the -use of su-
pervisory powers, but dismissed the case on other grounds. 3 It is not
clear from either Justice Stevens' or Judge Rafeedie's opinion exactly
what fact pattern would compel a court's use of supervisory pow-
302. Downing, supra note 15, at 594; see also Abramovsky, supra note 13, at 201-
03. Professor Abramovsky depicted a scenario in which four armed Iranian agents
abduct Aramco's CEO at its corporate headquarters in Houston, Texas. See
Abramovsky, supra note 13, at 151. On route to Teheran, "[tjhe captive is informed
that he is under indictment for complicity in the plundering of national resources
from the Rumaila oil fields in violation of the sovereignty of Iran." Id.
303. Downing, supra note 15, at 594.
304. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2191-93; see also historical discussion, supra
notes 41-163 and accompanying text.
305. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2205 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (citing United
States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 342 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)).
306. See supra note 55-68 and accompanying text.
307. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2206 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra
note 273-78 and accompanying text. Justice Stevens seemed to invoke the Court's
supervisory powers in the final pages of his analysis when he discussed the need for
the Court to preserve its integrity and stand against illegal government practices. See
Alvarez-Machain 112 S. Ct. at 2206 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Interestingly, instead of
citing McNabb or other sources of the supervisory power doctrine, Justice Stevens
cited Toscanino, a due process case. Id. at 2206 n.37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
308. See United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 615 (C.D. Cal. 1990), offd
sub nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 948 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112
S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
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ers.' What is clear from the majority opinion, however, is that ab-
ductions alone are not enough.
310
B. Impact on the Executive Branch-Free Reign in the War on Drugs
The Alvarez-Machain decision provides the executive branch with
considerable discretion in the realm of international law enforcement.
In particular, the decision represented an important victory for the
Bush Administration's "War on Drugs."31 ' Because of Alvarez-
Machain, the DEA's right to pursue a variety of extralegal methods in
arresting drug traffickers abroad stands unquestioned.1 Supporters of
the Court's decision argue that executive discretion is necessary to
effectively handle the unique political and diplomatic factors involved in
gaining custody over criminals abroad.3"3
1. Official Means of Rendition-The Costs and Improbabilities
After a foreigner has been indicted, the United States government
must decide whether to utilize formal extradition procedures or resort
to other means. An essential consideration in this decision is whether
the Justice Department believes that the foreign government will com-
ply with an extradition request. 14
With respect to Mexico, the Mexican government can invoke several
valid exceptions to extradition, all of which are specified in the extradi-
tion treaty.3 For example, in Dr. Machain's case, the Mexican govern-
309. See United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir.) (Oakes, J., concurring) (sug-
gesting that the federal government's repeated illegal abductions of drug traffickers
invite exercise of the court's supervisory power) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975).
310. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2196 (holding that the defendant's abduction
was shocking, but it did not prohibit him from being brought to trial).
311. Terry Eastland, Suprme Court Rightly Passes the Ball, LA. TIMEs, June 18,
1992, at B7.
312. Id. Prior to the Court's decision, the Justice Department gave FBI agents au-
thorization to carry out abductions abroad without the asylum nation's consent. Hear-
ings before the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1989) (statement by William P. Barr, Assistant U.S. Attorney General).
313. See On U.S. Kidnapping, The Issue is Who Decides to Do It or Not, WASH.
TMES, June 21, 1992, at B2.
314. See Abramovsky, supra note 13, at 153-56.
315. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex. art. 5, 31 U.S.T. 5056, 5063-
65 (providing exceptions to extradition when the offense charged is of a political or
military nature); id. at art. 8 (providing an exception for capital offenses); id. at art.
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ment could have refused a request for extradition by relying on Article
9(1) of the Treaty."6 Article 9(1) provides that neither party must de-
liver its own nationals, provided that the requested party submit the
case to its own courts.317 However, despite assurances that Mexican
authorities would proceed against Dr. Machain, the alleged slowness
and corruption of the Mexican judicial system raised doubts among U.S.
prosecutors whether vigorous prosecution would actually occur.38
In the case of Colombia, U.S. prosecutors have absolutely no hope of
winning extradition because the Colombian Constitution forbids it.31"
Thus, while Colombian courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the most
powerful drug traffickers in the world," the Colombian judicial sys-
tem is virtually incapable of prosecuting alleged offenders because Co-
lumbian drug traffickers wield such enormous power."
9(1) (providing that neither party must deliver its own nationals as long as the re-
quested party submits the case for prosecution at home).
316. See id.. at art. 9. U.S. prosecutors predicted that this would happen because
official Mexican policy is to extradite its own nationals only in "extraordinary circum-
stances." Lieberman, supra note 13, at A3; Abramovsky, supra note 13, at 206 n.271.
Nations which refuse extradition of their own nationals usually do so out of concern
that the defendant may receive ill treatment or unfair trial in the requesting state.
Abramovsky, supra note 13, at 155 n.10.
317. Extradition Treaty, supra note 315, at art. 9(1).
318. William S. Smith, A Question of Morality Over Legality, LA. TIMES, Oct 25,
1992, at M5; see also Abramovsky, supra note 13, at 155 n.12 (noting that the
principle defendant in the Camerena murder case bribed his way out of an airport
after the Mexican police surrounded his jet); Jim Newton, Camerena's Abduction and
Torture Described, LA. TIMEs, Dec. 10, 1992, at B2 (noting that at least two Mexican
Cabinet members and the governor of Jalisco were involved in the Camerena mur-
der); Jim Newton, Top Mexican Officials Tied to Drug Cartel, LA. TIMES, Dec. 3,
1992, at B2 (reporting high-ranking Mexican officials' alleged involvement in drug
trafficking and attempts to evade the DEA).
319. See 4 ALBERT BLAUSTEIN & GISBERT FLANZ, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD 2 (1989) (Colombian Constitution).
320. Rachel Ehrenfeld, Perspective on the Drug War, LA. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1992, at
M5. After years of violence and a virtual reign of terror by the Medellin Cartel, Presi-
dent Gaviria promised to repeal Colombia's extradition treaty with the United States
if the principle drug traffickers would turn themselves in. Id. After the treaty was re-
pealed, Pablo Escobar, one of Colombia's most infamous druglords, surrendered to
Colombian authorities. Mathea Falco, Don't Knock Colombia for Dealing With the
Devil, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 1991, at B7. However, Escobar's captivity became a mock-
ery of the Colombian penal system. Pablo Escobar: The Getaway, WASH. POST, July
24, 1992, at A26. Escobar bribed his own corrections officers and continued his drug
operations uninhibited while in jail. Id. Escobar later escaped from his plush hillside
"prison" when Colombian soldiers came to transfer him to a more secure military
prison. Id.
321. Douglas Farah, Colombia Turns to Courts, WASH. POST, June 21, 1991, at A26.
Between 1981 and 1986, "narco-terrorists" assassinated more than 50 judges, including
12 Colombian Supreme Court justices. Major Peter M. Sanchez, The "Drug War". The
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Moreover, in Colombia and in other drug producing countries such as
Bolivia and Peru,. the local economic dependence on drug trafficking
hampers government cooperation in extradition proceedings.an In Bo-
livia and Peru, roughly a quarter of the working population depends
upon the coca enterprise for survival.' Therefore, when dealing with
drug producing countries, the chances of gaining custody over drug
traffickers or cartel leaders through formal extradition are slim at
best.' 4
2. Unofficial Means of Rendition--Sub Rosa Agreements and
Abductions
When extradition is not available, the executive branch must consider
"unofficial" means of rendition. Sub rosa, or "under the table" arrange-
ments, in which the respective governments agree to some sort of infor-
mal exchange, are common, particularly between the United States and
its southern neighbors.'
In 1989, following Dr. Machain's indictment, the DEA and the Mexi-
can Federal Judicial Police (MFJP) attempted to reach such an agree-
ment.' Under the terms of the arrangement, the MFJP offered to de-
liver Dr. Machain in return for deportation of Isaac Moreno, a United
States resident wanted in Mexico for theft.'2 When Mexican officials
attempted to modify the bargain by demanding a $50,000 advance for
US. Military and National Security, 34 A.F.L REv. 109, 113 (1991). In response,
President Gaviria proposed extensive judicial reforms, including a special court sys-
tem with anonymous judges. Id, Nonetheless, in light of the continued strength of
Colombia's drug cartels and its "drug-dependent" economy, (Colombia's cocaine ex-
ports amount to an estimated $2 billon-$3 billion a year) there is little reason to
believe that the drug lords will be brought to justice. Mathea Falco, Don't Knock
Colombia for Dealing With the Devil, LA. TIMES, June 25, 1991, at B7; see generally
Mark Andrew Sherman, United States International Drug Control Policy, Extradition,
and the Rule of Law in Colombia, 15 NOVA L REV. 661 (1991).
322. Sanchez, supra note 321, at 114-15. In the poorer regions of these countries,
the coca crop returns overshadow legal crops by ten to one. Id. America's high de-
mand for illegal drugs results in these high prices. Id. at 112.
323. Id. at 115.
324. See id.
325. Abramovsky, supra note 13, at 160-65.
326. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 602 (C.D. Cal. 1990), afd
sub nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machan, 948 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112
S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
327. Id.
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transporting Dr. Machain to the United States, the DEA refused and
negotiations were discontinued.' Only then did the DEA seek to gain
custody of Dr. Machain by abduction.'s
However, when sub rosa agreements work, they offer an expedient
and effective alternative to the slow and even risky process of formal
extradition.' Because of the delay involved in fulfilling an extradition
request, the criminal may be able to bribe government officials or leave
the country."1 Thus, in pursuing Rafael Caro-Quintero, another sus-
pect indicted for the Camerena murder, the United States government
purposely avoided formal extradition and persuaded Costa Rican au-
thorities to informally deport Caro-Quintero.' Not surprisingly, such
cooperative "arrangements" are the most desirable course of action be-
cause they efficiently secure custody without infringing on the sover-
eignty of the asylum government.'
After the Justice Department attempts both formal and other cooper-
ative means of gaining custody, the government will ultimately consider
abduction.' The dominant concern with abduction is the impact such
328. Id.
329. Id. at 602-03. The DEA negotiated the terms of both the failed sub rosa ar-
rangement and the abduction through the same Mexican official, Antonio Garate. Id,
In planning and executing the abduction, Garate employed both former and current
military police officers. Id. at 603. In contrast to the terms of the failed agreement,
payment iould be made after Garate delivered Dr. Macham. Id. The DEA eventually
paid the abductors $20,000 and, in several cases, relocated the abductors to the Unit-
ed States and provided continuing compensation of $6,000 per week. Id. at 604.
330. See Abramovsky, supra note 13 at 155-56.
331. See id.
332. See id.
333. Id. at 206-07. Nonetheless, such arrangements are not risk-free. In 1988, United
States Marshals sought the cooperation of the Honduran military in capturing Juan
Ramon Matta-Ballesteros, a Honduran national who escaped from a U.S. prison.
Downing, supra note 15, at 593. Members of the Honduran military complied and
seized Matta. Id. They placed him on a plane bound for the Dominican Republic,
where United. States Marshals waited to receive him. Id Despite the official coopera-
tion of the Honduran government, the incident spurred violent protests in front of the
American embassy in Honduras due to the perception of U.S. involvement Id. The in-
cident hindered future cooperation with the Honduran government. Id.
334. LaFraniere, supra note 4, at A2. In 1989, the Justice Department issued its
most recent position on international abductions, which authorized the FBI to abduct
foreign nationals subject to outstanding arrest warrants. Hearings before the House
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1989).
Most significantly, the opinion stated that the FBI does not need permission from the
foreign government before conducting this form of rendition. Id.
Although, the Clinton Administration's formal position on international abduction
is currently unknown, President Clinton's most recent statements indicate that he
would rule out abduction as a means of rendition. See Clinton, High Court Differ on
Abduction, LA. TIMEs, Dec. 16, 1992, at A6.
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action will have on foreign relations.336 In the majority of cases, the
costs of a possible international incident outweigh the benefits of gain-
ing custody.w However, when a heinous crime or a more notorious
criminal is involved, the Justice Department will more likely risk paying
the political costs.3
a. The abduction of Dr. Machain and the Mexican reaction
The DEA made such an assessment in the case of Dr. Machain.=
Dr. Machan was one of nineteen persons indicted for their involvement
in the 1985 torture and murder of DEA agent Enrique Camerena.'
During Camerena's kidnapping, the doctor allegedly prolonged his life
so that his captors could continue their interrogation and torture.'
Given the heinousness of the crime, the victim's status as an officer of
the United States government, and that Mexican police officers would
be taking part in the abduction, the Justice Department likely reasoned
that the diplomatic repercussions, if any, would be minimal." Howev-
er, to its surprise, the Mexican government lodged a formal protest and
demanded the doctor's return.' Mexico's discontent eventually culmi-
nated into a formal but brief suspension of DEA activities in Mexico
following the Supreme Court's decision in Alvarez-Machain.3 World
reaction to the Court's decision was equally negative.' As a result,
Secretary of State James Baker HI offered reassurances to Mexico that
335. Downing, supra note 15, at 591-94.
336. Id, Resorting to abduction will most likely have negative ramifications on U.S.
relations with its extradition partners. Id. For many countries, the extradition treaty
is an important cooperative agreement, and therefore, "self-help" remedies are breach-
es of trust by the United States. Id. The resulting loss in confidence in the extradi-
tion treaty mechanism reduces the chances that a foreign nation will grant formal ex-
tradition requests. Id. The distrust engendered in the area of extradition naturally
affects the United States' influence in other spheres of international cooperation. Id.
337. Id. at 574-77. For instance, when, attempting to gain custody of known terror-
ists, abduction is less objectionable because a strong international consensus approves
of bringing such criminals to justice. Id,
338. See Lieberman, supra note 13, at AS.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. See id. For coverage of the negotiations leading up to the abduction of Dr.
Machan, see supra notes 169-78 and accompanying text.
342. Marjorie Miller, Mexico Attacks Ruling; Halts Drug War Role, LA. TIMES, June
16, 1992, at A6.
343. Id,
344. LaFraniere, supra note 4, at A2.
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the United States respected Mexico's territorial sovereignty.'
b. The utility of abduction as a "Tool" of law enforcement
Despite the negative reaction from the world community, Secretary
Baker's pronouncements did not renounce the United States' right to
resort to abductions in the future.' Justice Department officials re-
gard abduction as a necessary law enforcement tool, particularly when
there is officially sanctioned terrorism or drug trafficking. 7 Thus, al-
though the Administration promised to carefully weigh the foreign poli-
cy considerations before it undertakes an abduction, its statement as-
sumed that the ability to implement such irregular means is an inherent
part of executive discretion.'
It is precisely this view of executive discretion that Chief Justice
Rehnquist appears to support in Alvarez-Machain.' In ruling that the
extradition treaty does not prohibit abductions, the Court silently rec-
ognized the executive's need to resort to a variety of means to gain
custody over criminals abroad.-'
VI. CONCLUSION
The flurry of press reports and editorials immediately following
Alvarez-Machain have for the most part denounced the Supreme
Court's decision."' Justice Stevens called the decision a "monstrous"
affront to accepted principles of international law which insults Mexi-
can soveriegnty and harms United States foreign relations on a global
scale.3" Notwithstanding the potency of these attacks, from a purely
legal point of view the Alvarez-Machain decision is supportable.' 3 Su-
345. Id.
346. See id.
347. See id. (statement by Robert S. Ross Jr., former head of the Justice
Department's Office of International Affairs).
348. See id.
349. See Terry Eastland, Supreme Court Rightly Passes the Ball, LA. TIMES, June
18, 1992, at B5; supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
350. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2196-97 (1992); see also
supra notes 198-234 and accompanying text
351. See, e.g., David J. Scheffei, Sanctity of Law It Stops At Border, Outrageous
Court Decision Says, PHOENIX GAzgmr, June 18, 1992, at A19; Comity, Not Kidnap-
ping, WASH. POST, June 16, 1992, at A20; Jeopardizing Relations With Mexico, LA.
TIMEs, June 16, 1992, at B3.
352. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2206 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
353. See On U.S. Kidnapping, The Issue is Who Decides to Do It or Not, WASH.
TIMES, June 21, 1992, at B2; Terry Eastland, Supreme Court Rightly Passes the Ball,
LA. TaMES, June 18, 1992, at B5; Court Decision Was Right, But U.S. Policy May Not
Be, ATLANTA J., June 17, 1992; see generally Matorin, supra note 98; see also histori-
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preme Court precedent aptly supports the holding that the official ab-
duction did not violate the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty.' Admitted-
ly, the Court's approach to treaty interpretation is narrow and
textualistic, but not without reason. Treaties are negotiated contracts
between nations, and thus the absence of a particular term is the stron-
gest evidence that the parties never intended the term to exist.'
Moreover, preventing the implication of terms through general interna-
tional law is justified when such norms would inject an unwanted ele-
ment of uncertainty into treaty creation and enforcement.' There-
fore, in light of the foregoing, it is the policy behind the State
Department's choice in authorizing unilateral abductions that must be
subject to criticism, not the Supreme Court's decision."
On one hand, the case for abductions in rare circumstances is com-
pelling. Failing formal methods of rendition, abduction may be the only
way to bring a criminal to justice when the foreign government partici-
pates in or sanctions his criminal activity.'
On the other hand, the government's resort to extralegal methods
seriously undermines international cooperation in law enforcement.'
Unilateral abductions have a decidedly negative effect of weakening ex-
isting treaties, both in extradition and other areas of law enforce-
ment.' Of greater concern, however, is the negative effect that ab-
cal discussion, supra notes 41-163 and accompanying text.
354. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2188, 2192-93; see also historical discussion,
supra notes 40-162 and accompanying text.
355. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193-97; see also discussion on treaty inter-
pretation, supra notes 283-87 and accompanying text.
356. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2195-96; see also supra notes 222-34 and
accompanying text.
357. See Court Decision Was Right, But US. Policy May Not Be, ATLANTA J., June
17, 1992, at A18; Terry Eastland, Supreme Court Rightly Passes the Ball, LA. TIMES,
June 18, 1992, at B7; On US. Kidnapping, The Issue is Who Decides To Do It or
Not, WASH. TaMES, June 21, 1992, at B2.
358. See Abramovsky, supra note 13, at 153-56; see also discussion on difficulties in
formal extradition, supra notes 314-24 and accompanying text.
359. See Abramovsky, supra note 13, at 153-56; see also discussion on abductions
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